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Abstract 
This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the underlying theories of the regulation of the 
underrepresentation of women on boards. In particular, it focuses on the Canadian board gender 
diversity policy found in National Instrument 58-101F1. The theories justifying regulation of this 
issue are typically categorized into business case rationales and normative rationales. Through an 
analysis of the regulatory journey of the Canadian policy, it is argued that while securities 
regulators claim that the policy contained in NI 58-101F1 was rooted in business case rationales, 
it in fact arose from normative concerns. Not only that, but because of the policy’s weakness, it 
does not achieve its stated objective which is to increase female participation on reporting issuer 
boards.  
It is further argued that neither the business case nor the normative case have been accepted by 
those on Canadian public boards. A deep analysis of these theories, their pitfalls, and the possibility 
to combine the two, reveals that it may be time to amend the Canadian diversity policy even if this 
means the acceptance by the regulator and the business community of one, both or neither of the 
business or normative cases.  
The final chapter presents a range of regulatory options which are more likely to enhance women’s 
participation on public boards than the current policy. Which of these options and what exact form 
regulation should take are questions this thesis leaves up to the securities regulators.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Boardroom diversity has become one of the hottest topics in corporate governance in recent 
years. It has sparked global notice and is in the news across the world daily.1 Despite all this 
attention, boards of large, publicly traded firms in Canada still remain heavily under-diversified. 
Women for instance represent just 15% of members on these boards.2 In 2014 the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA) implemented a gender diversity disclosure policy aimed at 
increasing female participation on reporting issuer boards.3 The policy though has had little impact. 
The looming question is what, if anything, should be done to rectify the issue of 
underrepresentation of women on boards in Canada?  
This thesis will begin with a review of the literature regarding women’s underrepresentation 
on boards. There will be a focus on the underlying rationales which are most typically used to 
justify regulation aimed at increasing the number of women on boards. These rationales fall into 
                                               
1 Afdhel Aziz, “The Power Of Purpose: Why Companies Need ‘Knowledge + Network’ To Drive Diversity And 
Inclusion”, online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2019/02/14/the-power-of-purpose-why-
companies-need-knowledge-network-to-drive-diversity-and-inclusion/>; “Canada lags behind the U.S. on putting 
women in corporate boardrooms | CBC News”, (28 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-board-gender-diversity-1.5074233>; Michelle Davis, “JPMorgan to 
Name Record Number of Female Managing Directors”, (24 April 2019), online: 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/jpmorgan-said-to-name-record-number-of-female-
managing-directors>; Velluvar, “Malaysian Banks Lead Southeast Asian Peers for Board Diversity - Bloomberg”, 
online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-17/malaysian-banks-lead-southeast-asian-peers-for-
board-diversity>; “Asian Companies With More Women on Boards Deliver Better Results”, Bloomberg.com (27 
June 2019), online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-27/asian-companies-with-more-women-
on-boards-deliver-better-results>; Ventures Africa, “The AFRICA CEO FORUM launches its diversity charter to 
strengthen female leadership in Africa”, (20 June 2019), online: Ventures Africa <http://venturesafrica.com/the-
africa-ceo-forum-launches-its-diversity-charter-to-strengthen-female-leadership-in-africa/>; “Mastercard AGM to 
feature human rights and gender pay votes”, (10 May 2019), online: Corporate Secretary 
<https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/shareholders/31601/mastercard-agm-feature-human-rights-and-
gender-pay-votes>; Lexology, “ASX 200 reaches 30% women directors | Lexology”, online: 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=957f7cc4-b882-4fbb-9abd-b195e1073354>. 
2 CSA Multilateral Staff Notice 58-310 Report on Fourth Staff Review of Disclosure regarding Women on Boards 
and in Executive Officer Positions, OSC CSA Notice (27 September, 2018) ["CSA Multilateral  Staff Notice 58-
310"]at 1. 
3 National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices OSC NI 58-101F1 [NI 58-101F1]. 
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two broad categories: the business case and the normative case. Both have several iterations, but 
neither has been successfully integrated into Canadian corporate governance rhetoric. The sluggish 
progress demonstrates that business leaders have actually accepted neither the normative nor the 
business case. 
In Chapter 2, the origin of the CSA gender diversity policy in Canada will be examined. An 
argument will be put forward that the amendments to National Instrument 58-101F14 first arose 
from social justice concerns. Further, after considering international board gender diversity 
policies and how these fared, the Canadian securities regulators selected a model that they knew 
would be unlikely to achieve its stated objective.   
Thirdly, a deeper analysis will be provided of both the business and normative rationales in 
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The business case has been formulated in many ways, yet none has 
successfully persuaded Canadian public issuers to diversify at the board level. Critical mass and 
risk aversion will be analysed in great depth in order to show what may be missing from the 
business case. Critical mass theory, while very popular in the literature dealing with women on 
boards, has not been convincingly demonstrated empirically because there have yet to be enough 
women on boards to test this theory. Male and female risk aversion and its possible connection 
with systemic risk will be critically analysed. An argument will be presented that gender diversity 
on boards may contribute to the reduction of systemic risk. The securities regulators, given that 
their mandate includes promoting the reduction of systemic risk, may be required to examine board 
gender diversity from this perspective.  
                                               
4 Ibid. 
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The normative case will subsequently be examined. It may be necessary to view the board as 
other than a wealth maximizer to sustain the normative case. However, even accepting the 
shareholder primacy norm, including in its most extreme form in US corporate law, directors are 
still entitled to pursue board diversity efforts. It will also be argued that it may be possible to 
reformulate the business case and to combine same with the normative case.  
Finally, a look at regulatory options will follow in Chapter 5. It will be argued that, at the very 
least, NI 58-101F1 should be amended to contain a stricter comply-or-explain policy, or 
alternatively, that even stronger regulatory intervention may be necessary and justifiable. If it is 
true that the federal government, the provincial governments, and the securities regulators wish to 
see the needle move, issuers may need a push in the right direction. 
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1 Chapter 1 “Déjà Vu”: Literature Review 
1.1 “FORMATION”: THE BOARD 
Scholars have yet to agree about the board’s importance in relation to a firm’s overall 
functioning.5 Thus the question arises as to whether the composition of the board matters if the 
board is not determinative of corporate performance but only window dressing. The impact of 
increasing board diversity (and by extension regulation aimed at increasing board gender diversity) 
depends upon the board’s influence itself.6 Dhir offers some justification for beginning with the 
board when discussing the underrepresentation of women in the upper echelons of corporate 
Canada and regulation of this phenomenon. First, he notes that corporate law in Canada provides 
directors with a great deal of power and responsibility, placing the board at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy.7 The Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) as well as the provincial statutes 
require board members to be of a certain age, financial standing, mental capacity, and for a quarter 
of the directors to be resident Canadians.8 Furthermore directors are responsible for extremely 
important aspects of corporate oversight, some of which they are prohibited from delegating to 
management, including voting on mergers and acquisitions, approving financial statements and 
bylaws, and issuing dividends.9 The board is responsible for monitoring management and 
                                               
5 Kimberly Krawiec, John Conley & Lissa Broome, “A Difficult Conversation: Corporate Directors on Race and 
Gender” (2014) Pace International Law Review 416 at 23; Aaron A Dhir, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity 
(2015) at 28, 29 & 165; Akshaya Kamalnath, “The Value of Board Gender Diversity vis-a-vis the Role of the Board 
in the Modern Company” (2015) SSRN Electronic Journal, online: <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2608301> at 99. 
6 Dhir, supra note 5 at 165. 
7 Ibid at 26. See also James A Fanto, Lawrence M Solan & John M Darley, “Justifying Board Diversity Board 
Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps” (2010) 89 NC L Rev 901 at 906; Sonja S Carlson, 
“Women Directors: A Term of Art Showcasing the Need for Meaningful Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards 
Student Scholarship” (2012) 11 Seattle J Soc Just [i] at 338. 
8 Canada Business Corporations Act RSC, 1985, c-C44, sections 105(1), 105(3), and 106(3) [“CBCA”]; Ontario 
Business Corporations Act RSO, 1990 c B16, sections 116(1), 127, and 133. See Dhir supra note 5 at 30. See also, 
Kamalnath, supra note 5 at 93. 
9 Dhir, supra note 5 at 31. 
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approving the actions thereof. It is also there to advise executives and to provide important external 
networks and signals to the public.10 
  There is a theory that once boards diversify, other levels of the corporation may in turn see 
greater diversity. For instance, a Canadian Conference Board study found that corporations with 
more women on their boards in 1995, had 30% more women in executive roles by 2001 as 
compared to corporations with all-male boards in 1995.11 A study conducted using data from the 
MSCI All World’s Index published  in 2016, found similar results, namely that those corporations 
with three or more female directors had a higher average percentage of women in senior 
management.12 Matsa & Miller also found that each 10 percentage point increase in women on 
boards increased the likelihood of having women among the top five executives in the next year 
by 0.9 percentage points.13 Tinsley and Purmal more recently found that as female representation 
on boards increases, females are much more likely to be appointed as CEOs of large, US 
companies.14 Thus, there is evidence of what Matsa and Miller term “gender spillover” from the 
board to the executives.15  
Directors are often blamed in the wake of corporate scandals and failings, usually for not 
doing enough.16 Thus, it can be argued that boards (especially those of public companies) play a 
                                               
10 Fanto, Solan & Darley, supra note 7 at 909. For a discussion of how effective, or ineffective, these signals might 
be, see Lissa L Broome & Kimberly D Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 1132884 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2008). 
11 David Brown, Debra L Brown & Vanessa Anastasopoulos, Women on boards: not just the right thing ... but the 
“bright” thing (Ottawa, ON: Conference Board of Canada, 2002) at 8. See also, Carlson, supra note 7 at 384. 
12 Meggin Thwing Eastman, Damion Rallis & Gaia Mazzucchelli, “The Tipping Point: Women on Boards and 
Financial Performance” (2016) 23 at 9–10.  
13 David A Matsa & Amalia R Miller, “Chipping away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in Corporate 
Leadership” (2011) 101:3 The American Economic Review 635 at 637. 
14 Catherine H Tinsley & Kate Purmal, “Research: Board Experience Is Helping More Women Get CEO Jobs”, 
Harvard Business Review (29 July 2019), online: <https://hbr.org/2019/07/research-board-experience-is-helping-
more-women-get-ceo-jobs>. 
15 Matsa & Miller, supra note 13 at 638. 
16 For example see the TSX-published report in the 1990s entitled “Where Were the Directors?” See National Policy 
58-201: Proposed National Policy 58-201 Effective Corporate Governance (2004) [“NP 58-201”]. A specific 
 6 
critical role in corporate governance and the capital markets.17 So questions of their composition 
are of the utmost importance in the realm of securities, corporate governance, and the regulation 
of each of these. 
However, other scholars view the board’s role as superfluous. On this view, the board’s 
role is largely to sign off on the actions of management. Executives hold the true power. Directors 
do not have any impact on a company’s performance and so the board’s composition should make 
little difference either to individual corporate performance or to capital markets generally.18 The 
argument is that since boards do very little, diversifying them makes little sense. The counter to 
this argument of course is, if boards do so little, what is the disadvantage of them being diverse? 
In sum, in seeking to improve diversity within Canadian public corporations, the board is at 
least a logical place to start. First, because statutorily, it is the center of the corporation. Second, if 
it is accepted that change in the boardroom leads to change throughout companies, then regulation 
of diversity on boards should have a broad impact. Thus it seems that the board “offers a contained 
and sensible place to begin diversification initiatives”.19  
                                               
example is the case of Bre-X, one of the most notorious Canadian corporate scandals in history. A small Alberta 
mining company which allegedly struck gold in Indonesia’s stock exploded in the mid-1990s. It turned out that the 
projections being publicly disclosed were a result of tampering with core samples. Once these fraudulent disclosures 
were brought to light, Bre-X’s stock plummeted. This scandal ended in criminal trials for the company’s directors 
and a great deal of speculation as to how much they did or did not know and why they were not able to prevent the 
massive fraud.  For a full description see Christopher C Nicholls, The Bre-X Hoax: A South East Asian Bubble, 32 
Can. Bus. L.J. 173 (1999). See also Fanto, Solan & Darley, supra note 7 at 912; Kamalnath, supra note 5 at 95. 
17 Angela Foster, “A quest to increase women in corporate board leadership: comparing the law in Norway and the 
U.S.” (2017) 26:2 Washington International Law Journal, online: 
<http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A494500603/LT?sid=googlescholar> at 382. 
18 Krawiec, Conley & Broome, supra note 5 at 423; Dhir, supra note 5 at 29; Kamalnath, supra note 5 at 99. 
19 Dhir, supra note 5 at 29. 
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1.2 “FLAWS AND ALL”: UNDERLYING THEORIES OF REGULATION OF THE 
UNDERREPRESENTATION OF WOMEN ON BOARDS  
“[T]he way regulation gets framed as a problem shapes the solutions that get conceived and 
adopted, as well as their prospects for success… Advocates of new regulatory initiatives should 
think carefully about how to frame the problem of regulation and whether the reforms proposed 
are responsive to the problems identified.”20 In order to understand how the underrepresentation 
of women on boards is or should be regulated, it is important first to understand how the problem 
to be regulated is perceived. The arguments used by proponents of regulation aimed at increasing 
representation of women on corporate boards fall into two main categories. There are those who 
conceive of the underrepresentation of women on boards as a financial or instrumental issue, 
whereby corporations (and their shareholders) are missing out on the business benefits female 
directors bring. Alternatively, there are those who conceive of female underrepresentation on 
corporate boards as a social justice issue. “Should boards diversify to rectify inequality or rather, 
to serve corporate needs?”21 For those who view this issue as a business-based problem, stronger 
securities regulation is justified in order to benefit the market and better protect investors. For those 
who view the problem as one of social justice, regulation is justified using normative arguments. 
Business case rationales tend to be appealing both to businesses and securities regulators. 
Academics more recently have noted the weaknesses of the business case and have cautioned 
against its use in favour of a normative-based justification for change.22 Both rationales have been 
heavily criticized and are steeped in controversy.  
                                               
20 Jodi L Short, “The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform” (2012) 63 Hastings Law Journal 62 at 680–681. 
21 Darren Rosenblum, “When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms” (2018) 20 U Pa J Bus L 429 at 437. 
22 David A Carter et al, “The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial 
Performance: Board Diversity and Financial Performance” (2010) 18:5 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 396 at 412; Deborah L Rhode & Amanda K Packel, “Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference 
Does Difference Make” (2014) 39 Del J Corp L 377 at 400; Lisa M Fairfax, “Board Diversity Revisited: New 
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1.2.1 The Business Case  
The business case is complex. Over time regulators and scholars alike have put forward 
many iterations of this rationale to justify or criticize regulation of the underrepresentation of 
women on corporate boards. First, there is the straightforward version of the business case which 
states simply that increased gender diversity enhances financial performance.23 Second is the idea 
that greater board diversity will lead to improved corporate governance, a result which may not 
necessarily enhance financial performance, at least in the short term.24 A third iteration is that by 
enhancing gender diversity on corporate boards, a corporation consequently must be accessing a 
wider talent pool. In turn access to a greater talent pool should lead to better business outcomes.25 
These iterations along with criticisms of each will be described in detail.  
1.2.1.2 Financial Performance 
The last three decades have seen a wealth of studies examining the relationship between 
boardroom gender diversity and financial performance. These studies have used a variety of 
                                               
Rationale, Same Old Story Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps” (2010) 89 NC L Rev 
855 at 879. 
23 Aaron Dhir, “Toward a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception o f the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, 
Law and Diversity” (2010) 35:569 Queen’s Law Journal, online: 
<https://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Document/I2f63d114791c11df9b8c850332338889/View/FullText.html?navigatio
nPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad62d34000001669c20faad71e406b5%3FNav%3
DCAN_JOURNALS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI2f63d114791c11df9b8c850332338889%26startIndex%3D1%26co
ntextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=337
36f6821d3fea2f208b0977f01527e&list=CAN_JOURNALS&rank=3&sessionScopeId=bb12fe98e3624689adc50eaf
9da6e8b242a12ee233f5276122d4df598d2ab7e1&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchIte
m&contextData=%28sc.Search%29> at 593; Rhode & Packel, supra note 20 at 382–383; Catalyst, “Why Diversity 
and Inclusion Matter: Financial Performance”, (31 July 2018), online: Catalyst 
<https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-and-inclusion-matter-financial-performance>; Fairfax, supra 
note 20 at 1860; Geneva R Fountain, “The Case for the Business Care Rationale” (2016) 15 Fla St U Bus Rev 81 at 
83; Fawn Lee, “Show Me the Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender Targets in the EU 
European Union Law Issue: Note” (2013) 36 Fordham Int’l LJ 1471 at 1481; David Carter et al, The Diversity of 
Corporate Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 972763 (Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 2007) at 4. 
24 Rhode & Packel, supra note 22 at 393. 
25 Carter et al, supra note 23 at 10; Dhir, supra note 5 at 42; Niclas L Erhardt, James D Werbel & Charles B 
Shrader, “Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance” (2003) 11:2 Corporate Governance 102 at 
12; Rosenblum, supra note 21 at 441. 
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metrics to measure financial performance, including Tobin’s Q,26 Return on Assets (ROA),27 
Return on Sales (ROS),28 Return on Equity (ROE),29 and Return on Investment or Invested Capital 
(ROI/ROIC).30 Financial performance studies have given rise to varying results. Some have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between boardroom gender diversity and financial 
performance, while others have shown either no relationship or in some cases a negative 
relationship. Interestingly, those demonstrating a positive relationship significantly outnumber 
those which demonstrate a negative relationship. 
a) Studies Showing a Positive Relationship in Chronological Order 
A significant number of studies spanning multiple decades have found a positive relationship 
between increased gender diversity and improved financial performance using a variety of 
financial performance metrics. In the 1990s, Erhardt et al in a study of 127 large, publicly traded 
American companies between 1993 and 1998, found that there was a positive relationship between 
board diversity and ROA as well as ROI.31 This led the authors to conclude that diversity may be 
connected to enhanced monitoring of management.32 Enron, 33 they argued, is a typical example 
                                               
26 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio comparing a firm’s value with the cost of replacing its assets, Christopher C. 
Nicholls, Corporate Finance and Canadian Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 144; see also James Tobin 
and William C Brainard, “Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital”, Cowles Foundation Paper 440, 238 (1977) 
(reprinted from Private Values and Public Policy) for the original discussion of what is now called Tobin’s Q, online 
at: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p04a/p0440.pdf. 
27 Return on Assets is an accounting measure which reveals how much revenue can be generated from assets. It is 
calculated by dividing total earnings by total assets, see Fountain, supra note 23 at 86. 
28 Return on Sales is an accounting measure determined by dividing the pre-tax profit by revenue, see  Nancy M. 
Carter & Harvey M. Wagner, “The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards 
(2004-2008) (2011) Catalyst, online: 
<https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_and_women%27s_representation_
on_boards_%282004-2008%29.pdf>. 
29 Return on Equity is an accounting measure determined by dividing total income by equity, or shares, see 
Fountain, supra note 23 at 86. 
30 Return on Investment or Return on Invested Capital is another measure of firm performance calculated by 
dividing net income by invested capital see Carter & Wagner, supra note 28. 
31 Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, supra note 25 at 16. 
32 Ibid at 18. 
33 Ibid at 19. Enron is one of the largest corporate scandals in US history. The energy company was one of the 
largest, seemingly successful companies in the United States in the late 1990s. However, Enron filed for bankruptcy 
 10 
of the problems associated with homogenous boards.34 Campbell and Minguez-Vera observed that 
the percentage of women on public Spanish boards was positively and significantly related to 
Tobin’s Q.35 Campbell and Minguez’s data set consisted of observations of firms listed in Madrid 
from 1995-2000. They also concluded that the impact of firm value on the percentage of women 
was insignificant.36 Using data collected from 1998-2002, Carter et al found evidence of a causal 
relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance as measured by Tobin’s 
Q.37 Nguyen and Faff came to a similar conclusion in their study which used data from large 
Australian publicly traded corporations from 2000-2001. Their results indicated that, on average, 
if two firms are the same in every way except that one has female directors and one does not, the 
former’s Tobin’s Q will be higher than the latter’s.38 Further, as the number of female directors 
increases, so will Tobin’s Q. Thus, Tobin’s Q is positively related to both the incidence of female 
directors and the proportion of them on the board. They conclude that women appear to “play an 
essential role in maintaining the effectiveness of a board of directors.”39 Later, Conyon and He, 
using data from over 3,000 US public companies form 2007-2014, found a positive relationship 
                                               
in 2001 and it came to light that behind the scenes the executives were misappropriating funds and self-dealing 
while fraudulently reporting success to shareholders. For a detailed description see John R Kroger, “Enron, Fraud, 
and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective” (2005) 76 U Colo L Rev 57; Kristin N Johnson, 
“Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms Risk Oversight” (2017) 70 SMU L Rev 327 
at 346–347;See JC Coffee, “Understanding Enron: ‘It’s about the gatekeepers, stupid’” (2002) 57 Business Lawyer, 
The 1403 for an argument that Enron was actually a failure on the part of various gatekeepers, rather than on the part 
of the board. 
34 Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, supra note 25 at 19. 
35 Kevin Campbell & Antonio Mínguez-Vera, “Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial 
Performance” (2008) 83:3 Journal of Business Ethics 435 at 444. 
36 Ibid at 445. 
37 Carter et al, supra note 23 at 26. The authors were hesitant to definitively conclude that the relationship was 
causal because they could not say for certain that there was not a third variable impacting both gender diversity and 
Tobin’s Q. 
38 Hoa Nguyen & Robert Faff, “Impact of Board Size and Diversity on Firm Value: Australian Evidence” (2007) 4:2 
Corporate Ownership and Control, online: <http://virtusinterpress.org/IMPACT-OF-BOARD-SIZE-AND-
BOARD.html> at 28. 
39 Ibid. 
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between gender diversity on boards and Tobin’s Q.40 Schwartz-Ziv’s 2013 study demonstrated 
that board gender diversity, particularly where a critical mass41 of female directors is present, was 
positively correlated with ROE and profit margins.42 A few years after this, Eastman, Rallis and 
Mazzuchelli’s study, which used data from 2011 to 2016 of company boards from the MSCI All 
Country World Index, similarly concluded that companies with a critical mass of women on boards 
far outperformed those with all male boards using ROE as a measurement of firm performance.43 
Credit Suisse’s 2016 report, based on data concerning 27,000 senior managers at over 3,000 
corporations world-wide, found a strong link between more women in senior management and 
higher ROE as well as more conservative balance sheets.44 Finally, a McKinsey Report of 2018, 
whose authors collected data from 1,007 companies across 12 countries, concluded that 
corporations with greater board diversity were more profitable than those with less diverse 
boards.45  In summary, a great number of empirical studies spanning  many years and jurisdictions, 
                                               
40 Martin J Conyon & Lerong He, “Firm performance and boardroom gender diversity: A quantile regression 
approach” (2017) 79 Journal of Business Research 198 at 203. 
41The original theory of critical mass was expressed by Rosabeth Moss Kanter. Her theory of critical mass is that 
women represented at token levels within a group will either feel that they must over-achieve, or feel compelled to 
make themselves invisible. “The token must often choose between trying to limit visibility- and being overlooked- 
or taking advantage of the publicity- and being labeled a “troublemaker”.” Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and women 
of the corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1977) at 221. Either way, token women will feel socially alienated and 
this may affect the impact of gender diversity. Critical mass, its definition and application to women on boards will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
42 Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2257867 (Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, 2013) at 22. 
43 Eastman, Rallis & Mazzucchelli, supra note 12. 
44 Julia Dawson, Richard Kersley & Stefano Natella, “The Credit Suisse Gender 3000: Women in Senior 
Management” 52, online at Credit Suisse Research Institute <https://glg.it/assets/docs/csri-gender-3000.pdf> at 2 
and 12. Although this study focused on the relationship between female managers and ROE, the authors note that 
firms led by females tend to promote other women to leadership positions. Further, female executives further the 
pipeline of board-ready women.  
45 Vivian Hunt et al, “Delivering through Diversity” McKinsey & Company, (January 2018), online at McKinsey & 
Company 
<https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organization/our%20insights/delivering%20t
hrough%20diversity/delivering-through-diversity_full-report.ashx>. 
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using several financial performance metrics, have shown a strong positive relationship between 
greater board gender diversity and better financial performance.  
b) Studies Revealing No or Negative Relationship in Chronological Order 
Despite the significant evidence suggesting that board gender diversity is positively related to 
financial performance, there are a number of studies which indicate that this is not the case. Some 
such studies reveal no relationship between board gender diversity and firm financial performance 
and others find board gender diversity to be negatively related to financial performance. Adams 
and Ferreira, for instance, collected data from 1996-2003 from 1,939 firms of differing sizes.46 
Their results suggested that diversity was positively related to firm financial performance when 
the company had weaker governance policies, but negatively related to financial performance 
when the corporation had strong governance and monitoring policies in place.47 This, they 
concluded, is consistent with the idea that female directors tend to be stronger monitors of 
management. These results, according to the authors, also support the idea that if a board is already 
performing its monitoring function well, adding more females could lead to a breakdown in 
communication between management and the board, thus hurting the firm’s overall value. 48 
Conyon and He, as cited above, found that increased board gender diversity was significantly, 
negatively related to ROA.49  They found that gender diversity seems to have a much more positive 
impact on firms already performing well and a negative impact on lower performing firms. The 
authors’ explanation for this is that female board members’ value is less likely to be properly 
                                               
46 Renée B Adams & Daniel Ferreira, “Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance” 
(2009) 94:2 Journal of Financial Economics 291 at 295. 
47 Ibid at 308. 
48 Ibid at 304. 
49 Conyon & He, supra note 40 at 201. 
 13 
realized in lower performing firms focused on the threat posed by poor performance.50 In a 
subsequent study published in 2010, but using data from 1998-2002, Carter et al concluded that 
gender diversity had no impact on firm performance.51 Although their data did show in some 
regressions that gender diversity was positively related to ROA52, overall, they reported no 
evidence that higher numbers of female directors led to better financial performance.53 Dobbin and 
Jung, analysing data from Fortune 500 companies during firm years 1997-2006, concluded that 
increased numbers of female directors negatively affected stock value as measured by Tobin’s Q 
and had no impact on profits as measured by ROA.54 This conclusion was based on the authors’ 
observations that non-blockholding institutional investors tended to reduce their holdings in 
corporations who added women to their boards,55 but that the new female directors had no impact 
on board processes affecting ROA.56 Using data from 2007-2009, Ahern and Dittmar observed a 
negative relationship between increased board gender diversity and firm performance.57 This study 
examined the impact of a quota law implemented in Norway in 2003 which became mandatory in 
2006, requiring public companies to have 40% female directors on their boards.58 Ahern and 
Dittmar’s results indicated that following the mandatory quota law, increased gender diversity led 
to a downturn in the Norwegian market and was negatively related to Tobin’s Q.59 These results, 
                                               
50 Ibid at 208. 
51 Carter et al, supra note 22. 
52 Ibid at 408. 
53 Ibid at 411. 
54 F Dobbin & J Jung, “Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or 
Institutional Investor Bias?” (2011) 89:3 North Carolina Law Review 809 at 830. 
55 Ibid at 834. 
56 Ibid at 837. 
57 Kenneth R Ahern & Amy K Dittmar, “The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated 
Female Board Representation” (2012) 127:1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 137. 
58 Dhir, supra note 5 at 105. 
59 Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 57 at 140. 
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they note, may be explained by the fact that younger, less experienced directors were selected in 
order to comply with the quota, although there could be another explanation as well.60  
Importantly, a number of these studies were conducted at the same time and with similar data 
as those showing a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm financial 
performance. 
c) Criticism of the Financial Performance Case 
Many have criticized the business case as it relates to financial performance metrics because 
the empirical evidence is not conclusive. As Branson puts it: "Most knowledgeable scholars, those 
who do business and corporate finance rather than race and gender subjects, deny (and many 
lament their finding) that any correlation exists … empirical work on the subject conclusively finds 
that no correlation can be found between the composition of boards of directors and the value or 
profitability of publicly held corporations".61 
First, as demonstrated above, there is conflicting empirical evidence as to the relationship 
between board gender diversity and financial performance.62 Even within individual studies 
themselves results vary depending on which financial metric is used.  For instance, Conyon and 
He although they found a positive relationship between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q, they 
                                               
60 Ibid at 141–142. 
61 Douglas M Branson, No seat at the table: how corporate governance and law keep women out of the boardroom, 
Critical America (New York: New York University Press, 2007) at 176.  
62 See Rhode & Packel, supra note 22 at 382–393, wherein they review the literature on the financial performance 
case and conclude that the results are not convincing one way or the other; Fountain, supra note 23 at 87–90, 
wherein she remarks that even across similar time periods and using similar data, empirical evidence is still 
inconsistent when it comes to the relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance; Fanto, 
Solan & Darley, supra note 7 at 918; Kim Willey, “‘Bringing Canadian Women on Board’: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective on Whether Public Reporting of Gender Diversity Will Alter the Male-Dominated 
Composition of Canadian Public Company Boards and Senior Management” (2017) 29:1 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law, online: <https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/cjwl.29.1.182> at 184. 
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also found a negative relationship between board gender diversity and ROA.63 Even when the 
results seem to indicate a positive relationship between gender diversity and financial performance, 
this relationship in almost every case is correlative and not causal,64 with the possible exception 
of Carter et al’s 2003 study.65 These conflicting results pose a serious problem for proponents of 
board gender diversity as well as the regulators who rely on the financial performance case to 
justify diversity regimes.  
Another common criticism of the above studies is their methodological shortcomings.66 
Scholars note that many of the studies in this area are based on small sample sizes, over brief 
periods of time.67 Dobbin and Jung propound that studies showing positive relationships often use 
cross-sectional data and do not account for reverse causality. In other words, is a positive 
relationship demonstrated because firms who are already performing well financially nominate 
female directors more frequently or the reverse? When other forms of data are used, and reverse 
causality is accounted for, these authors claim, no or a negative relationship is more often shown.68 
However, these methodological shortcomings appear in studies showing a positive, negative or no 
relationship. For instance, Ahern and Dittmar’s study was based on cross-sectional data69 and a 
negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm financial performance was found.70 
Schwartz-Ziv also points out that Ahern and Dittmar’s study was examining board gender diversity 
which had been enforced “in one fell swoop”, rather than gradually.71 At most, Dobbin and Jung’s 
                                               
63 Conyon & He, supra note 40 at 203. 
64 Fairfax, supra note 22 at 863. 
65 And even in the case of this study, as previously mentioned, the authors were wary of concluding that there was a 
causal link because of the possibility of endogeneity. 
66 Rhode & Packel, supra note 22 at 390–393; Dobbin & Jung, supra note 54 at 813; Fountain, supra note 23 at 87. 
67 Rhode & Packel, supra note 22 at 391; Rosenblum, supra note 21 at 433. 
68 Dobbin & Jung, supra note 54 at 818. 
69 Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 57 at 147. 
70 Ibid at 140. 
71 Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 42 at 8. 
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criticism shows we may not truly understand the relationship, not that there is necessarily no or a 
negative relationship. As yet, no one has conducted a study of long term stock performance, 
deemed the “gold standard” of financial performance, as it relates to board gender diversity. 72 
Other critics remark that studies showing positive relationships typically encounter 
problems of endogeneity.73  That is, even where a positive relationship is shown, it may be that it 
is not increased gender diversity leading to better financial performance, but perhaps another factor 
altogether is behind both of these enhancements.74  Reverse causality, as described briefly above, 
is another endogeneity problem which emerges in a number of gender diversity empirical studies. 
Where a positive relationship is found between gender board diversity and financial performance, 
if reverse causality is present, it is really the enhanced financial performance that leads to greater 
gender diversity, not the other way around.75 The prevalence of endogeneity is a common criticism 
of the financial performance studies; however, several of the above mentioned works do in fact 
either account for, or address, problems of endogeneity, including reverse causality.76 
Interestingly, Campbell and Minguez specifically controlled for reverse causality and found that 
the correlation running between enhanced female board representation and Tobin’s Q did not run 
the other way.77  
                                               
72 Rhode & Packel, supra note 22 at 391, citing Joseph A. Grundfest, Diversity on Corporate Boards: When 
Difference Makes a Difference (Sept. 10, 2009) available at https://bdti.or.jp/en/blog/en/video-stanfords-joe-
grundfest-on-diversity-on-corporate-boards/.  
73 Dobbin & Jung, supra note 54 at 818; Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 293; Carter et al, supra note 22 at 403. 
74 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 295. 
75 Dobbin & Jung, supra note 54 at 819 where the authors state that it seems from the empirical evidence "firms that 
are having good runs are more likely to appoint women". See also Willey, supra note 62 at 191. 
76 Conyon & He, supra note 40 at 208; GSF Bruno, A Ciavarella & N Linciano, “Boardroom Gender Diversity and 
Performance of Listed Companies in Italy: A Natural Experiment”, (8 November 2018), online: Oxford Law Faculty 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/11/boardroom-gender-diversity-and-performance-listed-
companies-italy> at 26; Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 42 at 19; Nguyen & Faff, supra note 38 at 26. 
77 Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 35 at 445. 
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The available evidence as it relates to gender diversity of directors and firm financial 
performance, while mixed, seems to indicate a positive relationship. This is by no means a 
complete picture of the business case as it now stands.  
1.2.1.3 Governance Case 
A second iteration of the business case is what will be called the “governance case”. Greater 
gender diversity, it is posited, leads to enhanced corporate governance by virtue of better decision 
making and improved monitoring of management. Further, the public will take notice of this 
improved governance and this will lead to reputational benefits. The link to financial performance 
may not be immediate or direct. However, on this view, gender diverse boards will indirectly 
benefit the corporation’s bottom line in the long run. This rationale stems from both theory and 
empirical research.  
a) Improved Decision-making  
According to empirical evidence, diverse groups tend to solve problems more effectively than 
homogenous groups.78 This may be because heterogeneous groups are less likely to fall into what 
is termed “groupthink”. Groupthink is defined by Janis as a phenomenon where members of a 
group fail to consider alternatives because they place the agreement of the group above 
constructive dissent.79  
                                               
78 Hunt et al, supra note 42 at 23. See also Mariateresa Torchia, Andrea Calabrò & Morten Huse, Women Directors 
on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical Mass, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1858347 (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 2011) at 305 where the authors describe the support in the literature that heterogeneous 
groups solve problems in more creative ways than homogenous groups. 
79 Irving Lester Janis, Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes, 2nd ed.-- ed (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1982) at 9. See also Fanto, Solan & Darley, supra note 7 at 913; Maureen I Muller-Kahle & 
Krista B Lewellyn, “Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders” (2011) 19:5 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 405 at 406; Fountain, supra note 23 at 91–93; Dhir, supra note 5 at 125; 
Dobbin & Jung, supra note 54 at 4–7; Johnson, supra note 33 at 352.  
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Scholars attribute the disaster that was Enron to this phenomenon. Enron’s board was 
homogeneous, and so some scholars believe that the poor decisions, fraud, and eventual financial 
ruin was a result of groupthink.80 Because female directors are typically outsiders, who are not part 
of the “in-group”, they are believed to foster constructive dissent.81 In Adams and Ferreira’s 
sample, 84.07% of female directors were independent.82 Constructive dissent is viewed as vital to 
a successful boardroom. According to Sonnenfield, the most well-run corporations are those with 
“extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an obligation.”83  
It has also been reported that female directors encourage better attendance at meetings.84 Not 
only are women directors less likely than their male counterparts to have attendance problems, 
when they are present in greater numbers, the male directors’ attendance problems tend to shrink.85 
Attendance at board meetings is one of the most crucial ways a director fulfills her or his fiduciary 
duties86 and is thought to be a measure of overall board functioning.87 While at the meetings, 
female directors tend to foster a more collaborative discussion88 where they ask questions of 
                                               
80 Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, supra note 25 at 19. 
81 Dhir, supra note 23 at 592; Carter et al, supra note 23 at 9; Akshaya Kamalnath, “The Corporate Governance 
Case for Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Delaware Cases” (2018) SSRN Electronic Journal, online: 
<https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3128272> at 5; Rosenblum, supra note 21 at 452; Kent Greenfield, “The Third 
Way Berle V: Capital Markets, the Corporation, and the Asian Century: Governance, Accountability, and the Future 
of Corporate Law: The Fifth Annual Symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society” 
(2013) 37 Seattle U L Rev 749 at 766–767. 
82 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 294. In this study, “Directors are classified as independent if they have no 
business relation with the firm, are not related or interlocked with management, and are not current or former 
employees,” see Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 293. 
83 Jeffrey A Sonnenfield, What Makes Great Boards Great, Harvard Business Review, 7 (2002). A concern that 
once women are no longer represented in token amounts on a board is that they will no longer foster constructive 
dissent because their perspectives will no longer be fresh. A counter argument to this point is that so long as female 
directors remain for the most part independent, they should as a group and individually, continue to foster 
constructive dissent. See Dhir, supra note 5 at 158–159. 
84 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 296. 
85 Ibid at 298. 
86 Ibid at 295. 
87 Carter et al, supra note 22 at 18. 
88 Dhir, supra note 5 at 122. Collaboration does not mean that constructive dissent, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, disappears. Rather, collaboration seems to mean that everyone on the board, men and women alike, feel 
confident voicing their opinions.  
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management that would not otherwise be asked by male directors.89 These questions may be ones 
that men do not feel comfortable asking because they tend to be “more afraid to show that they 
might not know everything … to show that they’re not experts on everything.”90 Hence, along 
these lines, by increasing gender diversity the overall functioning of the board decision making 
process should improve. 
b) Improved Monitoring of Management 
Not only are female directors believed to lead to constructive dissent and enhanced problem 
solving, but by virtue of their independence, female directors are also thought to decrease agency 
costs. Agency theory was originally proposed by Jensen and Meckling in the mid-seventies.91 It 
has had great traction in the corporate governance realm. Tingle goes so far as to say that agency 
theory has become conflated with corporate governance itself.92 According to this theory, because 
ownership and control of a corporation are separated, managers (the agents of the shareholders) 
may be tempted to act in their own self-interest when their interests do not align with those of the 
principals. Any costs resulting from this relationship that would not exist in an owner-managed 
firm are deemed “agency costs”. The board therefore, is charged with monitoring the agents to 
ensure that they act in the principals’ best interests.93 A board risks being beholden to management 
                                               
89 Ibid at 120; Carlson, supra note 7 at 345. 
90 Dhir, supra note 5 at 120. 
91 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure 3 J. Finan. Econ. 305 (1976). 
92 Bryce Tingle, “What Is Corporate Governance? Can We Measure It? Can Investment Fiduciaries Rely on It?” 
(2018) 43:223 Queen’s LJ, online: 
<https://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Document/Ie5d24a0a6a2811e8a5b2e3d9e23d7429/View/FullText.html?navigatio
nPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad62d2e000001662bbc99f886c3ce02%3FNav%3D
CAN_JOURNALS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DIe5d24a0a6a2811e8a5b2e3d9e23d7429%26startIndex%3D1%26cont
extData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=22897
c5858f825d722499100011fbb9b&list=CAN_JOURNALS&rank=5&sessionScopeId=ac9d6a39816779565321c2fbc
5bf0a33673621e90e1be28eba0c31a93226a1be&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchItem
&contextData=%28sc.Search%29> at 229. 
93 Dhir, supra note 5 at 27. 
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if its members are themselves high level executives or if they are otherwise associated with 
management. Because female directors tend to be more independent, they are both in theory and 
according to empirical data, better monitors of management,94 and should therefore reduce agency 
costs.95  
Female directors also tend to be over-represented on audit committees.96 This may be another 
reason why female directors are associated with tougher monitoring. In addition, it has been found 
that more diverse boards tend to be engaged in less litigation and instances of fraud.97 If female 
directors tend to be tougher monitors and are more likely to be involved in the decisions relating 
to financial reporting of the firm, then it would follow that there would be fewer instances of fraud 
and less litigation surrounding fraud and directorial misrepresentation in corporations with more 
gender diverse boards.  
c) Corporate Reputation 
Corporate reputation clearly affects share price. At present, investors and the public generally 
do seem to be concerned with the issue of women on boards. This issue is in the news daily.98 
                                               
94 Ibid at 149. 
95 Nguyen & Faff, supra note 38 at 24. Agency theory and its short comings will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
96 Carter et al, supra note 22 at 21; Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46 at 300. 
97 Kamalnath, supra note 81 at 17. See also Mary Jane Lenard et. al., Female Business Leaders and the Incidence of 
Fraud Litigation 43(1)Managerial Finance 59 – 75 (2017); Douglas Cumming, T. Y. Leung and Oliver Rui, Gender 
diversity and securities fraud 58(5) Acad Manage J 1572 (2015). For more on the relationship between female board 
members and reduction of fraud, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.2. 
98 Michael Blanding, “Everyone Knows Innovation is Essential to Business Success—Except Board Directors”, (3 
January 2019), online: HBS Working Knowledge <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/everyone-knows-innovation-is-
essential-to-business-success-and-mdash-except-board-directors>; Toni G. Wolfman, “Viewpoint: In 2019, resolve 
to have more women on public boards”, online: Boston Business Journal 
<https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/01/03/viewpoint-in-2019-resolve-to-have-more-women-on.html>; 
Anjelica Tan, “Corporate diversity is just another misguided policy from Democrats”, (6 January 2019), online: The 
Hill <https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/424064-corporate-diversity-is-just-another-misguided-policy-from-
democrats>; Susan E. Reed, “Perspective | Corporate boards are diversifying. The C-suite isn’t.”, online: 
Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/corporate-boards-are-diversifying-the-c-suite-
isnt/2019/01/04/c45c3328-0f02-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2_story.html>; Elizabeth Olson, “Slow Gains for Women 
and Minorities on Boards of Big U.S. Firms, Study Says”, The New York Times (17 January 2019), online: 
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Securities regulators in 2014 received comments about the proposed diversity policy in great 
numbers from stakeholders supporting diversity regulation.99 By failing to diversify, corporations 
will suffer reputational losses because the investing public sees diversity as an important corporate 
governance issue. Not only will their reputation be damaged in this way, but additionally, less 
diverse corporations are typically subject to more discrimination litigation, thus resulting in 
financial loss as well as further damage to their reputation.100 
  Corporations may also miss out on opportunities if they do not have diverse management 
and do not view diversity as a priority. For instance, CIBC recently launched a prospectus offering 
for a fund only available to those corporations which, among other things, have at least 30% female 
directors or executive officers, or which had signed the Catalyst 2022 Accord.101 
Lastly, even if one does not accept that corporations suffer reputational damage by failing to 
diversify, they could still become the subject of institutional shareholder activism. Larry Fink in 
2018 wrote a letter to the CEOs of those companies in which BlackRock had shareholdings. This 
letter stated that BlackRock views diversity as better for business and diverse boards as “better 
                                               
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/business/women-minorities-corporate-boards.html>; Greg Ryan, “Mass. 
lawmaker Jason Lewis to file bill this week requiring women on corporate boards”, online: Boston Business Journal 
<https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/01/17/mass-lawmaker-to-file-bill-this-week-requiring.html>. 
99 Proposed OSC Amendments to Form 58-101F1 Corporate Governance Disclosure of National Instrument 58-101 
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices : Proposed Disclosure Requirements Regarding the Representation 
of Women on Boards and in Senior Management, OSC NI 58-101F1 (16 January 2014) [“Proposed Amendments”]. 
100 Janis Sarra, “Class Act: Considering Race and Gender in the Corporate Boardroom” 79 St John’s L Rev 41 at 
1122. This litigation, Sarra notes, unlike in the US, is less costly in Canada where human rights statutes are 
comprehensive statutes and so these types of claims may be viewed as the cost of doing business.   
101 Alexandra Posadzki , “CIBC to launch Canada’s first Women in Leadership Bond for institutional investors - The 
Globe and Mail”, (11 September, 2018) online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/streetwise/article-cibc-
to-launch-canadas-first-women-in-leadership-bond-for/>; The Catalyst 2022 Accord is a “pledge to accelerate the 
advancement of women in business through these actions: 1.Increase the average percentage of women on boards 
and women in executive positions in corporate Canada to 30% or greater by 2022. 2. Share key metrics with 
Catalyst for annual benchmarking of our collective progress”, see “Catalyst Accord 2022: Accelerating the 
Advancement of Women”, (8 November 2012), online: Catalyst <https://www.catalyst.org/catalyst-accord-2022>. 
More generally, this funding is not available to those companies whose main business is in alcohol, tobacco, or who 
have been involved in a scandal see Alexandra Posadski, “CIBC removes fossil-fuels restriction for its Women in 
Leadership bond - The Globe and Mail”, online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/streetwise/article-
cibc-removes-fossil-fuels-restriction-for-its-women-in-leadership-bond/>. 
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able to identify opportunities that promote long-term growth.”102 The Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board recently established a policy in which it will vote against the chair of the 
nominating committee if the board itself has no female members.103 Following the implementation 
of this policy, in 2018 the CPPIB voted at 22 Canadian company shareholder meetings for 
corporations in which it held investments and which had no female directors.104 Six of these votes 
included a vote against the nominating chair and seven included a vote against the whole of the 
nominating committee.105 ISS and Glass Lewis have also adopted a voting guideline which states 
that they will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of an issuer that 
does not have a formal written diversity policy and does not have a woman on its board.106 
d) Criticism of the Governance Case 
The governance case has not gone without criticism. Just as the financial performance metrics 
studies led to mixed results, the empirical evidence upon which the governance case is based, is 
also mixed.107 The theoretical basis for these mixed results is as follows. First, more constructive 
dissent may mean that decision making and problem solving takes much longer and is much more 
                                               
102 “Larry Fink’s Letter to CEOs”, online: BlackRock <https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter> ["Larry Fink's Letter"]. 
103 “Canada Pension Plan Investment Board to Increase Board Diversity Advocacy”, Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board, online: <http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2018/cppib-increase-board-diversity-
advocacy/>.  
104 “How CPPIB is advocating for more women on boards”, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, online: 
<http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2018/how-cppib-advocating-more-women-boards/>. 
105 “Canadian Pension Steps Up Gender Board Diversity Advocacy | Chief Investment Officer”, Chief Ivestment 
Officer (27 December 2018) online: <https://www.ai-cio.com/news/canadian-pension-steps-gender-board-diversity-
advocacy/>.  
106 Martin Lion, “Policy Guidelines”, online: Glass Lewis <https://www.glasslewis.com/guidelines/>; “ISS and 
Glass Lewis Update Proxy Voting Guidelines for 2019; ISS Updates Qualityscore an Issues Preliminary 
Compensation FAQS”, online: The National Law Review <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/iss-and-glass-
lewis-update-proxy-voting-guidelines-2019-iss-updates-qualityscore>. Yet another example of a private initiative 
(although not by an institutional investor) was taken by Heidrick & Struggles, a global executive search firm. They 
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difficult.108 However, in Dhir’s qualitative study, director participants reported that although 
consensuses took longer to reach, they did not view this as a bad thing. The board is not charged 
with making decisions quickly, they said. “[W] hat’s the success of a board meeting? Is it that it 
closes at a scheduled time? Or is it that you made a good decision?”109 Others noted that any 
inefficiencies due to tougher questions asked of management were likely the result of 
management’s unpreparedness to answer.110 
While female directors are usually more independent and so are better monitors of 
management, this might not always be positive for a corporation’s bottom line. According to 
Adams and Ferreira, enhanced monitoring for businesses with previously poor monitoring is 
typically good for financial performance. Conversely, for those companies who already have 
tougher monitoring, “overmonitoring” can hinder communication between management and the 
board and actually negatively impact financial performance.111 Coffee raises an important point 
regarding agency theory as well. Presently, corporate managers are compensated in ways that 
“encourage them to maximize share value and that align their interests much more closely with 
those of the shareholders than with any other constituency”.112 Thus having more executives on 
the board who are not independent (and who happen to be more often male) may not lead to costly 
agency externalities and may indeed be good for shareholder interests. 
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The empirical evidence does not support the idea that more independent directors are 
necessarily better for business either.113 More generally, empirical evidence has not definitively 
determined whether Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) rankings or corporate 
governance best practices (including CEO and chair separation) are better for firm performance or 
not.114 “[S]tudies of overall firm performance have found no convincing evidence that firms with 
majority independent boards perform better than firms without such boards.”115 Dalton’s results, 
for instance, suggest that board composition had nearly no impact on firm performance.116 If it is 
true that board composition has no effect on financial performance though, then one would expect 
that all of the metrics studies above would show no relationship between board gender diversity 
and firm performance. As Ahern and Dittmar point out, because a relationship is found (whether 
negative or positive) this indicates that board composition (and the board’s actions in general) is 
likely related to firm performance.117 It must be noted that Dalton’s study did not test the impact 
of board gender diversity on corporate performance, and so the results are not inconsistent with 
Ahern and Dittmar’s statement.  
Finally, while shareholder activists may be pushing for greater board diversity, scholars 
still debate whether shareholder activism is beneficial for the long term success of corporations. 
In fact the debate surrounding shareholder activism is extremely divisive both in the business 
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community and the academic realm.118 These institutional efforts and the controversy surrounding 
them will be analyzed further in Chapter 4.  
1.2.1.4 Talent Case 
“At Catalyst, we encourage companies to go beyond the traditional business case by focusing on diversity 
and inclusion as talent issues, rather than as the ‘bottom line.’” 
- Catalyst, The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004-
2008) 119  
In ignoring a large portion of the labour force, boards are failing to capitalize on a large 
pool of talent.120 This third version of the business case has been around for just as long as the 
other iterations, but has become more popular recently, perhaps because of the mixed empirical 
support for the other cases. The “talent” business case is supported by the number of female 
graduates from high level university and professional degrees. Women represent between 30% 
and 40% of MBA graduates at the top business schools in the US.121 Women have been 
graduating from university in larger numbers than men for years in Canada.122 Eastman et al’s 
study found that, globally, large companies with at least three female directors had almost double 
the average proportion of females in senior management.123 Thus, the authors conclude, greater 
numbers of women on boards leads to female talent being utilized at other levels. Their results 
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that companies with more women in senior management perform better financially supports the 
hypothesis that gender diverse corporations access the available talent more successfully.124  
An analogy has been drawn between the women on board case and the upturn in the 
economy in the 1960s.125 Once employers began accessing the talent of women and people of 
colour in the 60s, there was an economic boom. Gompers and Kovvali predict that corporations 
would realize a similar benefit if they were to fully capitalize on the available talent of females 
on boards.126  
Professor Dhir refers to another facet of this argument, namely, that Canada has lost talented 
women to other countries who prioritized diversity and who recognized their value.127 Thus, if 
boards continue to consider male nominees exclusively (or almost exclusively), Canada may 
continue to lose talented women to other nations.  
Lastly, extending the talent pool does not necessitate excluding those from the traditional 
pool; it is simply a way to bring different perspectives to the table.128 It can also be a way to 
bring gender balance to boards in industries where women are rare at every organizational 
level.129 In sum, the financial benefit is less direct than other business case rationales. 
a) Criticism of the Talent Case 
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The “pool problem” is a large hurdle proponents of the talent case must contend with. This is 
a pervasive argument used by opponents of stronger board diversity regulation.130 To be qualified 
for board membership usually means that one has had executive experience, with an emphasis on 
CEO experience.131 Thus, advocates of the pool problem reason, because fewer females have 
executive experience and certainly fewer females have CEO experience, there is a dearth of 
qualified females to be considered for directorships.132 
Scholars have pointed to various problems with this line of argument. First, the pool problem 
may be the result of an inaccurate view of the Canadian labour market.133 Second, it may be 
exaggerated as the reason for the lack of boardroom diversity.134 Finally, as Catalyst puts it, it may 
be a myth altogether.135 Further, it is possible that female nominees are held to a stricter standard 
than their male counterparts.136 Nearly half of male directors on Fortune 500 boards do not have 
CEO experience.137 Hence, it is clear that CEO experience is by no means a pre-requisite for 
directorships.  While it is true that there are fewer female senior executives than males, research 
demonstrates that women in upper management have the same ambitions to move up as their male 
counterparts.138 Furthermore, directors are typically hired because of executive experience and 
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often executives are hired because they have had boardroom experience. This problem therefore 
may be viciously circular in nature.139   
A number of solutions to the pool problem are offered in the literature. For instance, boards 
could implement internship programs to give aspiring women an opportunity to gain experience 
on a board, without being full-fledged members with the sway and liability that attaches to this.140 
Alternatively, boards could extend the pool from within which they search for candidates. Erhardt 
et al cite a reverse pool problem during the late 1990s where there was a lack of qualified males to 
fill board seats.141 It is not clear that this is still a problem but if it is, this would actually necessitate 
expanding searches beyond the typical “talent pool”.  
1.2.1.5 Conclusion 
The scholarly debate surrounding the business case is still very much alive. Although 
greater numbers of women have been appointed to boards in recent years, they still remain severely 
underrepresented.142 Scholars point to various reasons why the business case has had such little 
impact on boardroom diversity, despite its political appeal. It could be, some speculate, because of 
the mixed empirical results which the business case relies upon.143 Some remain entirely 
unconvinced of any relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance as well 
as corporate governance. “If there was some link between board diversity and firm performance, 
we would see some differential in trading values.  We do not...I also fail to see how cultural, 
religious, or gender based perspectives differ on, for instance, how to structure a debt offering or 
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divest an operating subsidiary,” one critic of board diversity regulation has said. 144 Still, the glacial 
pace of change remains a mystery even if a clear relationship has not been established. As Fairfax 
notes, other corporate governance best practices, such as the importance of director independence, 
were met with little to no resistance despite the mixed empirical results regarding their relationship 
with firm performance.145  
Others scholars warn against reliance on the business case for fear that gender diversity 
efforts will become conditional on share price and that it may cheapen the social justice case.146 
Finally, scholars point to the business case being “inextricably linked with the moral or social case 
for board diversity because moral and social rationales are embedded in the so-called business 
case”.147 Perhaps this linkage is why many remain unconvinced of the business case. 
1.2.2 The Normative Case 
The normative case has fewer iterations than the business case. In general, it is the idea that 
stronger regulation aimed at increasing the number of women on boards is justified because this is 
the right thing to do.148 Other nuances include the fact that historically women have been 
disadvantaged. Stronger regulation promoting female advancement is a way to rectify historical 
injustices.149 Normative rationales and social justice goals do seem to underlie most board 
diversification initiatives. McKinsey in its 2016 report recognized this, and stated that “social 
justice … is typically the initial impetus behind these [diversity] efforts…”150 Thus, even for those 
who support the business case rationale, it is widely accepted that the normative case is usually 
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the spark which ignites diversity developments. Further, some authors argue that the normative 
case is more persuasive than business case arguments.151 
However, just as “there is no “pure” business case for board diversity”,152 there may be no 
pure normative case currently either. To regulate the inner workings of corporate boards with 
purely normative rationales has so far proved difficult, if not impossible, for Canadian securities 
regulators. The Ontario Securities Commissions’ mandate is to “provide protection to investors 
from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; to foster fair and efficient capital markets and 
confidence in capital markets; and to contribute to the stability of the financial system and 
reduction of systemic risk.”153 The regulators, therefore, do not seem to have a statutory mandate 
or authority to implement a regulation which would damage the capital markets, or even to 
implement one which is not promoting the above mandate. Despite a certain amount of   “slippage” 
between the business case and the normative case,154 which will be described and discussed in 
greater detail in the proceeding chapters, securities commissions must justify any regulation of this 
issue, in part at least, with business case rationales. 
1.2.2.1 Criticism of the Normative Case 
a) Merit 
The normative case (provided it can stand alone) does not take into account what impact 
regulation has on corporate performance, or its greater potential impact on the capital markets. 
Following the normative case to its logical end suggests that mandatory quotas are the appropriate 
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solution to the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards, irrespective of the impact of 
such quotas on firm performance. 
However, even ignoring financial performance arguments, critics still point to some real 
concerns with mandatory quotas. For instance, TD has referred to quotas as the “antithesis of 
merit”.155 The House of Lords European Union Committee in 2012 stated that affirmative action 
“would risk fostering the perception – though entirely incorrect – that women on boards were not 
there by merit.”156 There is first the risk that women will be included on boards solely because 
they are women, regardless of their relative experience or directorial ability. The data from Norway 
suggests that this is a possible risk. Ahern & Dittmar’s study found that there was a downturn in 
the market after the mandatory quota regulation was implemented. As corporations scrambled to 
meet the regulation’s requirements, at the risk of dissolution, the authors speculate that board 
members with less experience were appointed.157  “People should not have to wonder, ‘Was I hired 
simply to check a box?’”158There is also a risk that women appointed after the quota’s 
implementation chosen entirely based on merit could still be viewed as having been appointed 
merely because they were women. Thus, there is a worry among critics of quotas that women 
appointed after quotas are implemented will be stigmatized.159  In Dhir’s study, although 
participants feared and expected that there would be stigma surrounding female directors 
nominated as a result of the Norwegian quota, after its implementation, board members found that 
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there was little to no stigma for those female directors.160 In fact, participants found that women, 
who they never would have otherwise heard of, who were impressively intelligent and competent, 
were appointed instead.161 Hence, an argument could be made that this type of regulation 
appropriately addresses systemic barriers and actually opens the door to deserving women who 
would, if not for quotas, go unnoticed.162 
b) Free Choice 
Following from the merit criticism is the free choice criticism: perhaps there are not enough 
women to fill board seats based on merit because women make different career choices from men. 
As Epstein asserts, women’s choices should not be questioned in order to achieve a social goal.163 
There are studies which show that women do not gravitate towards competition as frequently as 
men, despite performing just as well as men in competitive situations.164 If one considers attempts 
to move up in the corporate hierarchy to management positions and eventually board seats 
gravitating towards competitive situations, one would assume that there was evidence that women 
attempt this less than men. There is, though, evidence to suggest that it is not for lack of ambition 
that women leave management jobs. Instead, women report feeling under-valued and as if they 
have limited choices in their careers.165 Furthermore, there is actually very little evidence to 
suggest women leave their jobs in large numbers after having children. Survey data demonstrates 
that despite common perception, women in middle and top management roles have the same 
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aspirations as men in the same positions.166 They are also amenable in the same way as their male 
colleagues to compromise parts of their private lives in order to achieve their career goals.167 Thus 
the free choice argument may be based on speculation and gender stereotyping rather than on 
empirical evidence.   
c) The Market Should Decide  
In comparing the US approach with that of Europe, Epstein said:  
Women are, in ever-larger numbers, graduating from universities with advanced degrees in 
business and management. As they move up the ranks, their presence on boards may well increase, 
wholly without quotas…. Firms have every incentive to pick the best board members, male or 
female… So what is the difference between the Wall Street Journal and the EU’s approach? Simple. 
The former uses voluntary action and enlists high-profile leaders to make its case, while the latter 
uses coercion in a ham-handed effort to achieve some narrow and counterproductive initiative 
toward the same general end.168 
Critics of the normative case argue that the market should be left to correct the underrepresentation 
problem itself. There is no need for government interference because public companies already 
have all the motivation they need to hire the best directors.169 Discrimination is a market 
inefficiency, one which will be righted over time.170  
For proponents of stronger regulation, though, market based arguments disregard reality. 
Some describe the glacial pace of diversity in the boardroom as a persistent market failure.171 Dhir 
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describes one participant’s description of Norway’s quota law in the following way: “It was almost 
as if she was grudgingly accepting that the free market principles she held so dearly had 
disappointed her – and that the quota was a necessary correction of market failure.”172 During a 
senate debate, one which will be analysed  in greater detail in Chapter 2, Senator Ruth pointed out 
that while it is true that women are graduating at higher rates than men, leadership roles remain 
almost exclusively held by men. As she put it, “I observe, of course, that these numbers suggest as 
the pool of men shrinks overall they maintain leadership positions…”173 We are not seeing 
increasing graduation rates among women affect the top positions in corporate Canada.   
Pamela Jeffrey at the OSC’s roundtable dedicated to discussing the regulation of women 
on boards stated, “we will not be anywhere close to gender parity until 2097 at this pace of change 
here between half a percent and a percent a year. So 2097, we're all dead, and our children are 
dead, and our grandchildren. So let's get on with [it].”174 Although the rate of change has improved 
since 2013, it will still take approximately 50 more years to reach gender parity on Canadian public 
boards, and this is assuming that as board seats become available 50% will be filled by women, a 
higher female fill rate than there currently is.175 Thus, like free choice arguments, market based 
arguments may not have much evidence to support them.  
                                               
Bottom < www.theracetothebottom.org/independent-directors/women-on-the-board-and-market-failure-part-2.html 
>;Anita Anand & Krupa Kotecha, “Canada’s approach to board diversity needs a rethink”, (22 March 2017), online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/canadas-approach-to-board-diversity-
needs-a-rethink/article34386450/>. 
172 Dhir, supra note 5 at 117. 
173 Debates of the Senate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 29 (13 May 2010) at 563 (Hon Nancy Ruth) [“Senate Debate May 
2010”]. 
174 Ontario Securities Commission, Transcript: Roundtable Discussion Re Women on Boards and Senior 
Management, (October 23, 2013), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_oth_20131016_58-
401_transcript.htm ["Rountable 2013"]. 
175 Ontario Securities Commission, Transcript: Roundtable on the Third Annual Review of Women on Boards and 
Senior Management, (November 3, 2017),  available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/sn_20171103_transcript-wob-roundtable.pdf [“Roundtable 2017”]. 
 35 
d) Role of Board is to Maximize Shareholder Wealth 
Although some criticisms of the normative case may not be well supported in the literature, 
the board’s assumed role as a shareholder wealth maximizer is a persuasive argument against 
stronger regulation. Perhaps the reason why the business case is so politically attractive is because 
it appeals to those who see the board’s role as maximizing shareholder wealth. If the directors’ 
function is almost exclusively to enhance wealth, then a transformation of the board’s composition 
should only be undertaken if it would advance this goal. Hence, if gender diverse boards are not 
beneficial to shareholders, then diversity initiatives do not align with directors’ duties. Defining 
the board’s role this way is much more prevalent in the United States. Generally speaking, a 
director’s fiduciary duties in the US are assumed to be both to the corporation and its shareholders. 
There is a line of Delaware case law known as the Revlon series of cases which makes it clear that 
when a break-up or change of control transaction is inevitable, the board’s fiduciary duty is to sell 
the company to the highest bidder.176 Revlon has been interpreted and referred to in Canada. 177 
However, the Canadian Supreme Court in BCE clarified that the directors’ duties are to the 
corporation itself at all times.178 This fits with the statutory duties found in the federal and 
provincial corporate legislation.179 On the other hand, while supporting a stakeholder-friendly 
model of corporate governance (rather than a purely shareholder-centric model), the Supreme 
Court, in the context of a Revlon-type situation upheld a decision made by the directors which had 
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the effect of favouring the shareholders of the corporation over the debentureholders.180 Thus, it 
seems even in Canada the directors are more than welcome to favour the shareholders, even if they 
are permitted to consider “the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions.”181  
Very recently, section 122 of the CBCA was amended to include a subsection, essentially 
codifying the BCE decision, though with some modifications. Section 122(1.1) now specifically 
allows directors and officers, when acting with a view to the best interest of the corporation, to 
consider a list of various factors including the interests of employees, pensioners, consumers, the 
environment and the long-term interests of the corporation itself.182  
Thus, while it can be argued that Canadian corporations have a duty to the broader 
community and, as the Supreme Court of Canada has said, to be “good corporate citizen[s]”183, 
business corporations are nevertheless formed and operated in order to make profits. Despite 
upholding a stakeholder-centric model, the court will not penalize a board that acting honestly and 
in good faith prioritizes profit and shareholder wealth.184  
1.2.2.2 Normative Case Conclusion  
Like the business case, the normative case may not have garnered support in the business 
world because of the serious problems its proponents must contend with. It is difficult to rely on 
solely normative arguments when justifying regulation, especially mandatory quotas, because 
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what is being regulated is the private sector, namely for-profit corporations. The normative case 
may also need to be updated if it is to gain traction. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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2 Chapter 2: “Pretty Hurts”: The Canadian Diversity Policy: A Normative 
Initiative Masked by Business Case Rationales That Has not Achieved Its 
Stated Objective 
 
At the time of the original board gender diversity regulatory intervention in Canada, women 
represented half of the population, half of the labour force, the majority of university graduates,185 
and only 11% of board seats of publicly traded corporations.186 In the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, corporate governance was pushed to the political forefront. The United States employed 
stringent legislative reforms including the Dodd Frank Act.187 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the US implemented a diversity disclosure regime at this time as well.188 
Canadian legislators and regulators, in their usual way, took notice of the American securities 
regulation initiative. The issue of women on boards in Canada began to gain political traction. 
Senator Hervieux-Payette, beginning in 2009, sponsored bill after bill attempting to pass federal 
legislation aimed at increasing women’s participation on corporate boards.189 In her speech to the 
Senate in support of the first of these bills, Senator Hervieux-Payette made specific reference to 
the financial crisis and how increasing women’s representation on boards may help the Canadian 
economy in its recovery.190 By 2012, the federal government announced in the Economic Action 
Plan that it would be creating an advisory council composed of private and public sector figures 
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to “promote the participation of women on corporate boards”.191 The advisory council in its report 
dated March 29, 2012, advised that the federal government should work with provincial 
governments to develop a national approach to increasing female participation on boards.192  
Later, in 2013, the Ontario government encouraged securities regulators to prioritize 
regulation aimed at increasing the number of women on boards. After a consultation and comment 
period, Canadian securities regulators in 2014 amended National Instrument 58-101: Disclosure 
of Corporate Governance Practices to include a policy, the objective of which was to enhance 
female participation on reporting issuers’ boards and in executive officer positions.193 This work 
will focus on this instrument as it relates to women on boards. Since the amendment of this national 
instrument, Canadian public boards have seen glacial movement towards gender parity. Currently, 
women occupy 15% of Canadian public board seats.194 It is estimated that even if women fill 50% 
of upcoming available board seats, it will take 50 more years for reporting issuers’ boards to reach 
gender parity. This projection also assumes a higher female fill-rate than there currently is. In 
reality, women in Canada fill approximately 26% of newly available board seats.195 Perhaps this 
progress (or lack thereof) is because of the regulatory confusion about what the true goal of the 
regime should be. Or perhaps there was and still is confusion about the conception of the problem 
itself and why regulation is necessary.  
This chapter first will provide the history of NI 58-101F1’s amendments in order to show 
that the diversity disclosure policy originated out of a concern for fairness, rather than for business 
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case reasons. Its true objective therefore is to enhance equality, rather than simply to protect 
investors and better business. Following this, an argument will be made that, even if we accept the 
stated objective of the diversity disclosure regime—that is to enhance female participation on 
public boards in order to better business—the Canadian regulators did not implement a policy that 
would accomplish this goal. Despite being well aware of the plethora of regulatory options 
available to them and the respective impact of these options, the OSC selected a very weak means 
of intervention. The reason for this selection seems to be that while the regulators were required 
by the provincial government to address the board diversity issue, they did not want to face 
potential backlash from the business community. 
 
2.1 “INDEPENDENT WOMAN” AND THE NORMATIVE SEED WHICH SPROUTED THE 
DIVERSITY POLICY  
 
The Canadian diversity policy undoubtedly arose from social justice concerns about the 
underrepresentation of women on boards. These concerns were identified long before amendments 
to NI 58-101F1 were implemented. One can see that social justice was at the core of various 
attempts by Senator Hervieux-Payette, predating the NI 51-101 amendments, to pass federal 
legislation which would have introduced mandatory gender quotas on public corporate boards. 
2.1.1 Senator Hervieux-Payette’s Efforts  
2.1.1.1 Bill S-238 
In 2009, Senator Hervieux-Payette sponsored the first of four substantially identical bills, 
each of which had the objective of increasing women’s representation on corporate boards in 
Canada. Bill S-238 was the first of these, introduced in the wake of the financial crisis and during 
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the period that the US SEC was implementing its diversity disclosure policy and formulating 
regulations to implement certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. This bill proposed (among 
other things) to amend the CBCA to include a provision mandating that distributing corporations196 
have boards comprised of at least 40% men and 40% women.197 The preamble of this bill lists a 
number of reasons why women should be fairly represented on corporate boards. The first is that 
they are, as consumers and members of the business community, important economic participants. 
The second is that there are many women in Canada who have the qualifications and the right 
experience to be directors.198 Aside from asserting that there is no pool problem, the preamble 
states that women deserve to be represented fairly because they are active participants in the 
economy. It is thus for normative or fairness concerns, rather than for possible business benefits 
women may bring to firms once on boards, that they deserve a seat at the table.199  
In her speech to the Senate, Senator Hervieux-Payette offered a number of justifications 
for the bill. First, she argued that the market is not going to correct the problem of women’s 
underrepresentation on corporate boards, so government intervention is necessary.200 She cites 
various empirical studies in support of the business case to show that women add financial value 
to corporations.201 She then employs a talent-based business case in support of the proposed 
mandatory quota, citing Statistics Canada data. Specifically, she notes that women have since 1994 
                                               
196 Bill S-238, An Act to establish gender parity on the board of directors or certain corporations, financial 
institutions and parent Crown corporations, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl, 2009, cl 2. A “distributing corporation” is defined 
in section 2 of the Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001 (SOR/2001-512) as a reporting issuer (see 
Securities Act, supra note 153 at s1.1), or a corporation who has filed a prospectus in Canada or outside, a 
corporation which has publicly traded shares, or one which is involved in an amalgamation with a distributing 
corporation.  
197 Bill S-238, supra note 196, cl 2.  
198 Ibid at preamble.  
199 See Ibid at preamble. The third reason cited in the preamble is that women are equal democratic participants and 
so deserve to be represented in Crown Corporations. The amendments that these bills would have effected relating 
to the Crown Corporations Act are beyond the scope of this thesis however.  
200 Senate Debate June 2009, supra note 190 at 1010. 
201 Ibid at 1011. 
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graduated in greater numbers than men from every level of education except the doctoral level. 
And even at the doctoral level, females represented 43% of graduates in 2006.202 Thus, corporate 
boards are under-utilizing the talent represented by this highly educated segment of the population.  
Despite these invocations of both normative and business case justifications, Senator 
Hervieux-Payette’s comments about the financial crisis reveal Bill S-238’s true origin. She drew 
attention to this crisis and the fact that perhaps with more women on boards such a “moral failing” 
may not have occurred. “There may be no quick fix to the current financial crisis,” she said, “but 
a sure-fire, long-term resolution is to advance more women into leadership positions and provide 
the right environment for new perspectives to be heard.”203  
2.1.1.2 Bill S-206204 
After Bill S-238, which did not make it past its second Senate reading, Senator Hervieux-
Payette sponsored Bill S-206 which was substantively the same as Bill S-238. The long title, 
preamble and relevant sections of Bill S-206 are identical to that of Bill S-238. Senator Hervieux-
Payette provided almost the same remarks in support of this bill as she did for Bill S-238. Two 
other senators also contributed to the debate this time.  
First, Senator Frum provided a fairly weak argument opposing Bill S-206. Her argument 
opened with some figures based on a misunderstanding of mathematics, leading into a 
misunderstanding of the bill, and ended with what is essentially support for the objectives of the 
bill presented as opposition. Senator Frum proclaimed that women on boards have made enormous 
strides in recent years. In 1994, she noted, women represented 4% of directors in Canada. In 2008, 
                                               
202 Ibid at 1012. 
203 Ibid at 1012. 
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21% of newly appointed directors were women. This, she asserted, constituted a 425% increase.205 
Of course this is inaccurate. The fact that 21% of newly appointed directors were women has no 
bearing on the total percentage of female directors across Canada. All that it means is that in one 
year 21% of new board seats were filled by women and that 79% were filled by men.  Only if 
women directors by 2008 constituted 21% of all directors could one claim that the total percentage 
of women directors represented a 425% increase from 1994. In fact, according to a report published 
by Catalyst, in 2011 women represented 10.3% of board seats on publicly traded boards in Canada. 
This percentage had remained constant since 2009.206 The increased percentage claimed by 
Senator Frum is in error.  
After lauding the CBCA and the flexibility it allows corporations in structuring themselves, 
Frum stated that Bill S-206 would add a “harmful layer of intervention”. It should be up to the 
corporate shareholders and management to decide for themselves who is on the board, not the 
legislature.207 This is a fair point given the considerable degree of discretion and flexibility 
directors are given under corporate law in exercising their fiduciary duties208 and the statutory 
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rights to elect directors provided to shareholders.209 However, she goes on to add that the YWCA 
and the Canadian Nurses Association, which have almost entirely female boards, would be in 
violation of the proposed law, commenting that surely this was not the law’s intention.210 These 
corporations are of course not public companies and so would not have been in violation of Bill 
S-206.211  
Senator Frum concluded her argument with a market-based critique of the proposed quotas. 
She said that firms were at the time already becoming more diverse and that they were fully aware 
that “the wider your net, the more talent you will catch”.212 They do not need to be told or forced 
to diversify. If given time, she suggested, the free market should correct the underrepresentation 
problem. Instead, what Parliament should be concerned with is the education gap between men 
and women. Men are graduating at lower and lower rates from high school and university. It is 
possible, she observed, that years down the road men may be poorly represented at the highest 
corporate levels.213 This last point Sentaor Frum presented as an argument against Bill S-206. Yet, 
as Senator Poulin explains, this argument actually supports the bill.214 If the concern is that men 
may be underrepresented on corporate boards in years to come, implementing a quota which 
requires at least 40% representation of both men and women would protect men from being in the 
position of underrepresentation which women are in today.215  
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Later, in the following sitting, Senator Ruth provided her normative, social justice based 
support for Bill S-206. These remarks, taken together with the bill’s preamble and its roots in the 
catastrophe that was the financial crisis, represent the true justification of the mandatory quotas. 
Senator Ruth puts forward an argument against letting the market decide. The status quo favours 
those in power, she says, and power is never going to be given up willingly. She compares Bill S-
206 to employment equity efforts. She states that it would be “foolish” to conclude that 
employment equity has led to the advancement of women in token amounts or that those who 
benefited from employment equity would not have advanced except for this special treatment.216 
In other words, those who merited advancement would have moved up with or without 
employment equity legislation. Senator Ruth’s argument on this point appears to be contradictory 
in the sense that while she appears to be in favour of employment equity legislation, if the 
justification for employment equity is that those whom it helps would have advanced anyway 
because of their merits, why do we need employment equity legislation? An interview in Dhir’s 
qualitative study of Norwegian directors includes stronger reasoning. Quotas benefit those who 
although certainly merit advancement, would not advance were it not for quotas.217  
Senator Ruth goes on to point out that despite the educational gap between men and women 
and the shrinking pool of men, men still hold the majority of leadership roles. Thus, time passing 
alone will not fix the underrepresentation of women problem.218 
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2.1.1.3 Bill S-217 
Bill S-206 progressed no further than its second reading in the Senate. In 2014, Senator 
Hervieux-Payette sponsored Bill S-217 “An Act to modernize the composition of the boards of 
directors of certain corporations, financial institutions and parent Crown corporations, and in 
particular to ensure the balanced representation of women and men on those boards”.219 This bill 
did not make it through the Senate either.  If it were to have been successful, like the other bills 
above, the CBCA would have been amended to include a section mandating that distributing 
corporations have at least 40% of each gender represented on their boards.220 
  Her remarks in the Senate debate about Bill S-217, which were similar to those she 
provided for the previous bills, illustrate the underlying purpose of the bill. Senator Hervieux-
Payette asserts that the bill’s goal is “first to give 52 per cent of the Canadian population the same 
access to economic decision-making positions as men and, second, to provide for more diverse 
and therefore more effective decision-making.”221 These comments demonstrate the fact that at its 
core the bill has a social justice purpose, with a secondary economic purpose.  
Senator Hervieux-Payette touches on almost every aspect of both the normative and 
business cases. She justifies the quotas222 with the business case as it relates to the financial 
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performance studies described in Chapter 1. She also proposes a state legitimacy argument.223 This 
has not been widely used by proponents of stronger regulation in North America.224 The theory 
behind the state legitimacy justification is that, just as it is unacceptable in a democratic state to 
bar women from voting, so too is it unacceptable in a democratic economy to exclude women from 
business decision-making roles.225 There is no justification for using only half of the skills of the 
Canadian population.226 
Senator Hervieux-Payette then proposes another normatively based justification. She 
concludes by noting that no matter what the economic argument, this should not distract from the 
fact that equality is a powerful enough reason to add more women to corporate leadership 
positions. There have not been, she notes, similar financial performance studies conducted to see 
whether men positively impact companies’ performance and this, she adds, is not equal 
treatment.227 One weakness of this critique is that the studies that have been conducted are to 
determine if a change in law or policy is necessary or desirable. Since men are already over-
represented on boards, relative to their numbers in the general population, what would the purpose 
of such a study on their effectiveness be? Either the conclusion would be that men do add value 
(in which case no policy change would be indicated to be necessary) or it would demonstrate that 
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they do not add value, which would indicate that the real question that must be asked is whether 
women add value such that a change in policy is required. 
In response to Senator Hervieux-Payette’s endorsement, Senator Frum once again offered a 
critique of the bill and what it would mean for Canada. Frum’s argument can be categorized as a 
“the market should decide” critique of quotas. She points out that the sanctions for non-compliance 
with the quotas in Bill S-217 would be severe. Frum remarks that the bill does not address the true 
barriers to diversity, those being a lack of mentorship and networking for women in business. The 
private sector, she continues, is the bedrock of Canadian society.228 Canadians more and more are 
understanding that a lack of women’s participation is holding Canada back from reaching its full 
potential. Over the past 15 years, Frum asserts, there has been a dramatic increase of women 
participating on corporate boards.  We are headed in the right direction. Public companies are 
choosing to increase diversity not because of legislation, but because it is right. Frum also 
acknowledges the OSC’s efforts to implement a diversity policy.229 It is perhaps in part because 
of Frum’s remarks and criticism of the bill that Bill S-217 was unsuccessful and another federal 
bill like it was not brought forward again.  
 
2.2 “SURVIVOR”: SHIFT FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVINCIAL SECURITIES 
REGULATORS 
 
While Bill S-217 was before the Senate, securities regulators were asked to look at 
implementing a gender diversity policy for corporate boards of reporting issuers. The focus for 
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each of the senate bills discussed above was a concern for women’s rights and equality. Thus the 
federal government had been considering for a number of years whether the normative case 
primarily (combined with business case justifications) was enough to justify quotas. Each effort to 
implement quotas at the federal level was unsuccessful. So perhaps this is why the federal 
government looked to the provinces, who in turn sought an alternative regulatory body and a new 
form of regulation.  
At the same time as Bill S-217 was working its way through the House of Commons and 
eventually permanently stalling in the Senate, the province of Ontario was encouraging the Ontario 
Securities Commission to examine the issue of women on boards. As mentioned, the Economic 
Action Plan of 2012 established an advisory council to examine this issue.230 The advisory 
council’s report recommended that the federal government “should actively encourage and work 
with provincial and territorial governments, on an ongoing basis, with a view to ensuring a 
coordinated pan-Canadian approach to increasing women on boards.”231 Thus this issue became a 
provincial matter.  
In 2013 the Ontario government included a statement in its annual budget that it “strongly 
support[ed]” board gender diversity and that the government would work alongside the Ontario 
Securities Commission (OSC) to increase the number of women on corporate boards.232 In July of 
the same year, the OSC issued a Consultation Paper,233 held a roundtable,234 and requested 
comments from stakeholders to determine what form regulation of this issue would take.235 The 
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OSC in its report to the Minister of Finance and Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, 
summarized the feedback it had received from various stakeholders. Many stakeholders, the report 
stated, were in favour of a comply-or-explain regime. The majority of the stakeholders surveyed 
recognized the value of diverse boards and thought that it was time to take action.236 
This initiative beginning first with the federal government, then becoming a provincial project, 
arose out of a concern for social justice. The OSC’s mandate though requires that it, above all, 
protect investors and promote fairness and efficiency in the capital markets.237 Thus, it does not 
appear to have a mandate, or perhaps the jurisdiction, to implement a policy with a purely socially 
conscious aim.238   
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2.3 “HONESTY”: THE POLICY, THE OSC’S JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION, 
AND WHY IT WAS REALLY IMPLEMENTED 
2.3.1 The Policy 
The disclosure regime in NI 58-101F1 is what is referred to as a comply-or-explain policy.239 
A reporting issuer240 must first disclose if it does or does not have a policy regarding representation 
of women on its board of directors.241 If it has such a policy, it must also disclose what measures 
are taken to effectively implement the policy and the progress in achieving the policy’s objectives. 
If the issuer has no such policy, it must explain the reason why it does not.242 Secondly, reporting 
issuers must disclose whether or not they consider the representation and identification of women 
during their director nominating process. If an issuer does not consider the representation and 
identification of women in this process, it must disclose the reason it does not.243 Thirdly, the issuer 
must describe whether (and if not, why not) it has set targets concerning the representation of 
women on its board and what progress has been made toward reaching said targets.244 Lastly, the 
reporting issuer must disclose the number and percentage of women on its board at the time of 
disclosure.245 
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On May 1, 2018, Bill C-25 received Royal Assent. This bill, coming into force in 2020, will 
add section 172.1 to the CBCA.246 These amendments require that directors of prescribed 
corporations provide shareholders with all of the information which NI 58-101F1 items 10-15 
requires they disclose. Additionally, this bill replaces “women” with “designated groups” as 
defined by the Employment Equity Act.247 These amendments are certainly an example of stronger 
regulation of board diversity generally, but in terms of board gender diversity they do not impose 
any new regulatory requirements for reporting issuers.      
2.3.2 The OSC’s Justification for Implementation 
The OSC, in justifying the amendments to NI 58-101F1, focused on the business case. The 
Commission was open about the fact that the policy is designed to increase women’s participation 
on boards.248 The OSC’s justification for this is that women participating on boards is better for 
business, and disclosure about women’s participation benefits investors. In addition, The Minister 
for Women’s Issues and the OSC itself identified social benefits which may arise out of the 
policy’s implementation.249 The Consultation Paper quoted the Minister for the Status of 
Women250 as follows: “[B]oard diversity is not about quotas or tokenism. Board diversity is about 
better corporate decisions, better responses to market demographics, and better financial 
performance. It is also about the future, and having more women in key leadership positions to 
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serve as role models for young women and girls”.251 This quote demonstrates at least three 
rationales behind the regulation aimed at promoting gender parity on corporate boards. Those are: 
better financial performance, better decision making, and a normative or social justice rationale. 
These represent a few of the rationales used by proponents of board gender diversity to justify 
stronger regulation of this issue. The stated objective of the policy itself, according to the OSC’s 
Report, was that it was, “intended to encourage more effective boards and better corporate decision 
making by requiring greater transparency for investors and other stakeholders regarding the 
representation of women on boards and in senior management of TSX-listed and other non-venture 
issuers. This transparency is intended to assist investors when making investment and voting 
decisions.”252 Thus a further goal of assisting investors while they make decisions is included, 
likely in order to bring the policy within the OSC’s statutory mandate.   
2.3.3 The Real Reason for NI 58-101F1’s Amendments  
Why did the OSC, while proclaiming all the business benefits women would bring to the 
boardroom, choose a policy which in no way guarantees these benefits as an outcome? The obvious 
answer is that they were told to look at this issue by the government and wished to avoid any 
backlash from reporting issuers and those who might oppose an abrupt change in policy for the 
reasons discussed in Chapter 1 and as described at the various senate debates in Chapter 2. 
According to the OSC’s Report to the Ministers of Finance and Women’s Issues, most stakeholders 
thought that the contents of an issuer’s gender diversity policy should be determined by the issuer 
and not mandated by the OSC.253 There was very little support for implementing quotas.254 At the 
OSC’s roundtable discussion in 2013, Pamela Jeffrey spoke about the Canadian Board Diversity 
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Council’s research which indicated at the time that corporate directors did not support quotas. In 
fact, 38% supported the status quo, 62% did not, eight percent supported quotas, and 54% favoured 
a comply-or-explain policy.255 Thus, if the OSC were to have implemented mandatory quotas, 
corporate directors would certainly have been against, and likely spoken against, such a policy. 
Another reason behind the selection of a comply-or-explain policy justified by business case 
rationales could be that the government did not want to see the policy subject to the same criticism 
faced by Bills S-238, S-206, and S-217. 
The regulators attempted to please the government by exploring the issue as asked, as well 
as the business community by implementing a policy which did not necessitate much boardroom 
change if issuers did not feel so inclined. Furthermore, by justifying the implementation of this 
policy mainly with business case arguments, they avoided criticism about working outside of their 
mandate.  
This is not to say that they avoided all criticism in this regard. There were those who saw 
through the policy as a social justice effort falling outside the mandate of the OSC and other 
provincial securities regulators.256 Not only is this problematic, critics say, because it leads to 
regulatory burdens for issuers, but it is also a waste of the OSC’s resources that may otherwise go 
towards preventing fraud on the market.257 On the other hand, diversity proponents thought the 
policy was a good first step and would have liked to see stronger regulatory intervention. The 
Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan at the time supported a listing requirement mandating that issuers 
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with shares trading on the TSX add at least three women to their board by 2020. 258 Thus, while 
attempting to make everyone happy, the OSC still ruffled a few feathers. 
Notwithstanding the above complaints, the comply-or-explain policy was brought in to force 
with little controversy. Scholars note that this is a sign of the policy’s weakness.259  
 
2.4 “CHECK ON IT”: THE POLICY IS TOO WEAK TO BRING CHANGE 
2.4.1 Quotas, Comply-or-Explain, and Explain-or-Explain 
The question remains, though, if the intention is to bring about greater female 
representation on corporate boards because this is a demonstrated way to enhance business 
performance, why not implement quotas? The regulators were aware of a wide range of diversity 
policy options available to them. They reviewed the disclosure policies of several jurisdictions 
during the consultation process, including those of the US, the UK, and Australia. In addition they 
reviewed the policies of states with stricter, quota-based regulations such as Norway and France.260 
Canadian regulators would have also been aware of the impact of these different policy options. 
Jim Leech from the Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan, for instance, at the 2013 Roundtable 
conducted by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), said: “If you're serious and you really 
want to make that difference and you really believe in it, then set it up for seven years from now 
as a target, and people have to get there. And it's a listing requirement.”261  
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2.4.1.1 Quotas 
Several European countries adopted quotas before the Canadian regime came into effect. 
Norway was the first. The Norwegian Companies Act was amended to include a requirement that 
public corporate boards (of a certain size) be composed of at least 40% of the underrepresented 
gender.262 From 2004 to 2006 this quota was voluntary. There was insufficient compliance with 
the quota during the voluntary period. By 2006, 24% of board seats in Norway were occupied by 
women.263  This requirement became mandatory in 2006. Companies were to meet the quota by 
2008 or risk dissolution. Once it was mandatory, corporate boards became gender diverse very 
quickly.264 Eric Lamarre from the McKinsey Company, another panelist at the OSC’s 2013 
roundtable, noted that when disclosure based policies are implemented, female representation goes 
up by approximately a percentage point per year. He further pointed to the fact that without 
sanctions, quotas have similar results as comply-or-explain policies.265 
 This is not supported by what happened in France. After Norway, France adopted quotas. 
The French constitution was amended in 2008 to mandate that men and women be given the same 
access to professional and social leadership.266 In 2011 a law was passed implementing corporate 
gender quotas, requiring that public corporations and private corporations with a certain amount 
of assets and employees reach 20% female board participation by 2014 and 40% by 2017.267 Unlike 
in Norway, the punishment for non-compliance in France was not corporate dissolution. Instead, 
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if a company did not comply with the quota, the nomination of its directors would be null and 
void.268 The French gender quota was accompanied by a comply-or-explain regime.269 If public 
companies (as well as some private companies with significant assets or large numbers of 
employees) did not comply with the quota, they would have to explain their non-compliance in 
their annual report. Today, France is a leader in board gender diversity with 44.2% female 
representation.270 By 2014, France’s boards were composed of 35% women.271  
 
2.4.1.2 Disclosure without Quotas  
The US, the UK and Australia had introduced disclosure based policies prior to 2014. After 
these disclosure based policies were implemented, the number of women on corporate boards 
moved incrementally. 
a) The US 
The US effected what may be the weakest version of a diversity policy. In 2009, the SEC 
amended the proxy disclosure requirements to include this policy. Regulation S-K, Item 407(c)272 
requires that publicly traded companies disclose in their Proxy Statements whether the nominating 
committee “considers diversity in identifying nominees for director. If the nominating committee 
(or the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director 
nominees,” they must “describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating 
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committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”273 The Commission deliberately 
declined to define diversity, leaving the definition up to reporting corporations.274 The policy, the 
SEC claimed, was not intended to “steer behavior” but may lead to benefits such as increased 
board independence and access to a wider talent pool of candidates.275 Their belief was that 
investors would directly benefit from these disclosures.276 Prior to the policy’s implementation, 
women held 15.2% of Fortune 500 board seats.277 Approximately ten years after the policy’s 
implementation, 22.5% of directors of the Fortune 500 are women.278 The US’s federal diversity 
disclosure policy therefore has appeared to have very little impact on the number of women on 
public corporate boards.  
However, in the fall of 2018, Senate Bill No. Bill 826 (Bill 826) was signed in California. This 
bill adds sections 301.3 and 2115.5 to the Corporations Code. Bill 826 requires public corporations 
with “principal executive offices” located in California to have a minimum of one female director. 
This minimum number is to increase over time. By 2021 boards will be required to have at least 
two female directors if the board has five or more members, or 3 female directors if the board has 
at least six members. 279 This initiative has faced much controversy.280 Following Bill 826, other 
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states have begun to write similar legislation. The House in Illinois for instance recently passed a 
bill which was originally going to require that all public companies in Illinois have one female and 
one African American board member by 2020.281 It is as yet unclear what impact these initiatives 
will have on women’s representation on public companies. First, because the majority of public 
corporations in the US are incorporated in Delaware and are subject to Delaware state corporate 
law. Second, and relatedly, the California bill attempts to regulate companies with head offices in 
California but who may be incorporated elsewhere. This, critics say, may be an unconstitutional 
breach of the “internal affairs doctrine”.282   A conservative activist group, Judicial Watch, has 
launched a lawsuit against the California Secretary of State, alleging that the law is 
unconstitutional on the basis of sex discrimination.283 This is a surprising first legal challenge 
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because it is not on the basis of a breach of the internal affairs doctrine and was not launched by a 
corporation subject to the quotas. Regardless of these challenges, at the time of the Canadian 
policy, it could not have been known that a number of states years later would begin implementing 
quotas.  
b) The UK  
The British government in 2010 commissioned a report by Lord Davies regarding the barriers 
stopping women from being placed on boards in greater numbers and ways in which their numbers 
on boards could be increased.284 Following the report’s publication, the UK’s Corporate 
Governance Code was updated in September 2012. Two principles of the code relate to diversity. 
One principle states that board candidate searches should be conducted with an emphasis on merit, 
relying on objective criteria with appropriate weight placed on the benefits of diversity, including 
gender. Secondly, the board should review its performance, the performance of its committees, 
and the performance of directors individually. It should in this review consider, among other 
things, its diversity, including gender.285 Listed corporations must disclose their compliance with 
the Code’s principles and if they do not comply, they must provide reasons.286 This policy was 
accompanied by a recommendation that Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 companies 
aim for 25% female representation on boards.287 In 2010 women comprised 8.9% of board seats 
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in the UK. By 2017 women represented 20.3% of UK board seats. 288 This represents an increase 
of female board participation of approximately one to two percent a year.  
c) Australia  
Australia’s policy is a much more rigorous comply-or-explain policy. Eight core principles in 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations provide non-mandatory 
guidance to listed corporations regarding their board nominating process, board composition and 
board renewal process.  Recommendation 3.2, in 2014, stated that corporations should implement 
a diversity policy and disclose the content of this policy.289 This recommendation also provided a 
suggestion for what should be included in the diversity policy. Recommendation 3.3 stated that 
corporations should provide the measurable objectives they have in place to achieve gender 
diversity as well as the progress towards achieving these objectives. 290 Corporations must also 
disclose the number and percentage of women on boards and explain deviations from these 
recommendations. Before this regime, in 2010, women represented 10.8% of directors in Australia. 
By 2014 women represented 19.9% of directors in Australia.291  
 
                                               
288In 2015, a subsequent recommendation in the Hampton-Alexander Review, that FTSE 300 companies aim for 
33% female board representation by 2020, see “Women in the boardroom—5th edition”, online: Deloitte 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/risk/articles/women-in-the-boardroom5th-edition.html> at 71. 
289 Consultation Paper, supra note 186 at 11. 
290 Ibid at 12. 
291 Australia more recently has made substantial progress in increasing female board participation. They now lead all 
other countries with disclosure based regimes, with 28.7% of board seats being occupied by women in 2017, see 
“Quick Take: Women on Corporate Boards”, online: Catalyst <https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-
corporate-boards/>["Quick Take"]. There is some debate as to whether this is because of the diversity policy itself, 
or whether it is a result of private initiatives by institutional investors, see Jamie Smyth, “Australia’s Corporate 
Boards Shrink the Gender Gap”, online: OZY <http://www.ozy.com/acumen/the-gender-gap-on-australias-
corporate-boards-is-shrinking/92425>; “Australia Is Pushing for More Women in Boardrooms”, (6 March 2019), 
online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-06/push-for-diverse-boardrooms-extended-to-top-300-
australian-firms>. Currently, Australia’s listed corporations have boards made up of 29.7% female directors, see 
Greta Stonehouse, “Not enough women on ASX200 boards: AICD”, (25 July 2019), online: 7NEWS.com.au 
<https://7news.com.au/business/not-enough-women-on-asx200-boards-aicd-c-365480>. 
 62 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
After four attempts at a federal bill that would have required mandatory gender quotas for 
public boards, the Canadian federal government turned to the provinces to enhance women’s 
representation on boards. These bills and finally the diversity disclosure regime itself were rooted 
in concern for fairness. The business case seems to have been an after-thought. Setting the origin 
of the policy aside, the amendments to NI 58-101F1 do not even accomplish their stated objective. 
Canadian securities regulators were more than aware in 2014 of the efficacy (or lack thereof) of a 
comply-or-explain regime before amending NI 58-101F1. In attempting to avoid controversy, the 
regulators implemented a policy which accomplishes neither its “business case” goals, nor its 
normative goals. 
The evidence makes it very clear that the only way to guarantee immediate change is with 
quotas and penalties for non-compliance. Comply-or-explain and other disclosure based efforts 
have been much less successful than quotas if we measure success by an increase in women’s 
representation on corporate boards.292 Canadian securities regulators were aware of these policies 
and results before NI 58-101F1 was amended. They included a detailed description of international 
board diversity efforts in their Consultation Paper, even citing specific language of policies used 
across the world.293  They would have also been aware that a comply-or-explain policy without 
measurable targets would not be effective in raising the number of women on boards. If they knew 
                                               
292 There are those who do not believe this to be an accurate measurement of success. See for instance Letter from 
Beverly A. Behan to the OSC (10 February 2014) re Request for Comment on Proposed Amendments of NI 58-
101F1, online at <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5-Comments/com_20140210_58-
101f1_behanb.pdf>. She purports that the policy’s success should be measured by its impact on board functioning. 
If adding more women to boards, she says, enhances board functioning it will be a success. It will not be a success 
simply by virtue of getting more women on boards. 
293 Consultation Paper, supra note 186 at 9-17. 
 63 
this going in, one is led to the conclusion that they may have been paying lip service to the 
government and to stakeholders with the diversity policy.  
Hollins asserts that:  
Empirical targets produce better results, a better chance of success. We know this…If 
everyone agrees that gender parity-truly having women represent 50 per cent of the 
leadership of our institutions, companies, law firms-is a good thing, why are we so 
unbelievably fearful of actually setting that as our goal? And when we do, why is it 25 or 
30 per cent? Why is the goal not 50 per cent?294  
 
European countries who tried non-mandatory approaches were disappointed with the 
result, and since have implemented more stringent quotas. If Canada wishes to increase the number 
of women on boards, stronger regulation must be implemented. If it is true that quotas are outside 
the OSC’s mandate, then a stricter comply-or-explain policy with actual targets for corporations 
to comply with may be the answer. Alternatively, quotas could be implemented for a short period 
and phased out once there is gender parity on corporate boards.295 These alternatives will be 
compared in further detail in Chapter 5. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Norway’s attempt at 
voluntary quotas, perhaps it is the sanctions which provide the real motivation behind 
diversification. Therefore, maybe substantial penalties are the only way to move the needle. 
Ultimately, the policy in its current formulation has not and will not achieve its stated objective.  
On the other hand, the discussions at the OSC’s 2013 Roundtable could lead one to 
conclude that this weak intervention was only meant to be a first step. For instance, Eric Lamarre 
said: “So I think, at least for me, it's a no-brainer first step to go to comply or explain.”296 It is time 
to proceed to phase two. Before the policy is to be amended or replaced, perhaps it would be most 
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useful for the regulators to accurately articulate what the justification is behind the diversity policy. 
A justification may be most useful if it appeals to both diversity advocates and the business 
community. This may require a new formulation or a re-statement of the business case. 
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3 Chapter 3 “Start Over”: The Business Case Revisited  
“For many of us, the argument for women’s equality, for women’s rights, was first and foremost a 
moral argument and it was a political argument.... But I think where it is now an economic argument 
is in many cases a maturing of the argument that women’s rights are human rights but also a very 
important way of enlisting greater support.”297  
 
Chapter 1 detailed popular articulations of the business case. Those market participants with 
the power to substantially increase women’s board representation have not been persuaded by the 
business case as it is currently formulated. If the business case had become entrenched in corporate 
governance rhetoric, in the way, for instance, agency theory has,298 then just as public company 
boards have a plethora of independent directors, they would have a plethora of female directors. 
The empirical evidence demonstrating that greater numbers of independent directors lead to 
enhanced financial performance and lower incidents of fraud is inconclusive,299 just as the 
empirical evidence demonstrating a link between greater representation of women on boards and 
enhanced financial performance of the firm is unsettled. Agency theory has garnered significant 
traction, while proponents of board diversity are constantly on the defensive. Why? Could it be 
that agency theory is more intuitively appealing than board diversity theory though both are based 
upon mixed empirical evidence?  
In this chapter, two business case theories will be presented in order to suggest that a 
restatement of the business case may be possible. First critical mass theory will be discussed. This 
theory is widely accepted by diversity scholars. Due to the lack of women on boards it has been 
quite difficult to empirically test the critical mass theory. Next, Richard Roll’s Hubris 
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Hypothesis300 will be described and applied to female board representation.  Although risk 
aversion and overconfidence have been considered in the literature, this will be the first time Roll’s 
theory has been analysed as it relates to men and women generally and in the context of the 
boardroom. Thirdly, there will be an analysis of systemic risk and an argument will be made that 
systemic risk may be affected by boardroom gender diversity. To the author’s knowledge, this is 
the first time such an argument has been made. This chapter will include a possible restatement of 
the business case as well as an account of what remains missing from the literature. Although there 
are some gaps in the empirical evidence supporting critical mass and Roll’s theory, at the very 
least, the evidence does not contradict the business case. In fact, the evidence (while there remains 
certain weaknesses) points to a positive relationship between increased board gender diversity and 
enhanced board processes, firm financial performance, and decreased shareholder losses. Perhaps 
just as agency theory, while unsupported by clear and conclusive empirical evidence, has garnered 
ubiquitous support in the business community, the business case for women on boards may one 
day also garner such support.  
 
3.1 “ALL THE SINGLE LADIES”: CRITICAL MASS 
3.1.1 Critical Mass Theory 
Rosabeth Moss Kanter posed the original critical mass theory in the 1970s without ever 
using the phrase “critical mass”. She argued that proportions of men and women in an organization 
affect the relationship between men and women, the individual experience of women, and group 
dynamics generally. 301 Women in the upper echelons of a firm, according to Kanter, have “token” 
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status. This means that they are viewed by the majority or the “dominants”, as she refers to them, 
as representatives of their entire category and not as individuals in themselves.302  Women in the 
specific context of the organization Kanter was discussing, and even today at the top of 
corporations, are often, or have been, the one and only woman.303 This leads to a few 
consequences. They must face the visibility which accompanies their “one and only status” as well 
as stereotyping. Women at the top of large firms, dealing with enhanced visibility, often must 
choose between over-achieving by working harder than those around them, or finding a way to 
become invisible to others by retreating and avoiding conflict.304 While a token is very easily 
noticed, the tokens interviewed by Kanter reported that their accomplishments were often 
overlooked.305 One crucial point made by Kanter is that: “It was rarity and scarcity, rather than 
femaleness per se, that shaped the environment for women in parts of Indsco [the fictional name 
for the company Kanter studied] mostly populated by men.”306 In other words, women’s 
experience and the attitudes of others towards them are due to their status as the minority in the 
organization, not because they are female.  
 Kanter further notes the changes which can take place as proportions in a group setting are 
altered. For instance in a “skewed” group, the ratio of the majority group to the tokens being 85:15, 
the dominants oversee the group and its culture. The tokens are typically viewed as symbolic 
representations of their categories, rather than individuals. A “tilted” group is where the 
distribution is closer to 65:35 and there is a larger minority rather than a few tokens. As a larger 
group, Kanter believes that the minority has the ability to affect the culture of the group and begin 
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to be seen in their capacity as individuals, rather than as mere symbols. Finally, a “balanced” group 
where there are at least 40% of the minority is one where the culture and interaction reflects this 
balance.307 Kanter does not make specific reference to numbers; however, she does note that when 
only two women are present others may either assume that they are an interchangeable pair, or 
discourage and prevent an alliance to form between them. Thus, it is likely that only two women 
will not be enough to change a group’s culture.308   
Following Kanter, in the late 1980s, Drude Dalherup explained the origin of the term 
“critical mass” and extended Kanter’s theory in important ways. Critical mass is a phrase from 
nuclear physics. Specifically, it is the quantity needed to begin a chain reaction.309 Similarly, when 
the number of women within a group reaches a critical mass, this is what is needed to begin a 
noticeable change.310 Although Kanter argued that women in an organization are held back from 
their potential because they are in the minority, not because they are women, Dahlerup points to 
further barriers women face not just as the minority within an organization, but having the status 
of “minority” outside the organization as well.311 He lists a number of issues facing women (which 
include stereotyping and sexual harassment) some of which are compounded by women’s external 
status as “minorities”. Once a critical mass, or a larger minority of women is present, the group 
dynamic and the experience of the women as individuals should be affected. There should be a 
diminution of stereotyping, visible role models for women, and less resistance to women entering 
the field. 312  
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 While Dalherup is discussing critical mass theory in the context of Scandinavian politics, 
his points regarding the theory in general are insightful and relevant to any discussion thereof. 
Despite the fact that Dalherup is credited with extending the phrase “critical mass” in important 
ways to women’s participation in politics,313 he was not convinced that there was any real evidence 
as to what exactly the critical mass threshold is.314  
3.1.2 Women on Boards and Critical Mass 
Critical mass theory is by no means new. However, given the slow increase of women’s 
participation on boards worldwide, it has been difficult until recently to truly study the impact a 
critical mass of female directors may have on large public companies. Certainly in Canada the 
average board is still far from reaching what has been empirically shown to be a “critical mass” of 
women. It will be argued that this key component of the business case, while in no way new, may 
be what is missing from older studies examining female participation on corporate boards.  
While Kanter did not discuss critical mass theory as it specifically applies to a boardroom, 
it is not difficult to apply her theory to just that. A boardroom, like other organizational social 
groups, is a collection of people in a high pressure environment where men are normally in the 
majority. On average, Canadian public boards are comprised of 15% female directors.315 They 
therefore would tend to be what Kanter calls a “skewed group”. One can easily apply the remainder 
of what she describes as the token woman’s experience and why one or even two women on a 
board may not be nearly as effective as three or more. While Kanter was not advancing the 
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argument that a critical mass of women should lead to firm-wide outcomes, academics have 
studied this question and subsequently advanced this argument.316  
3.1.3 Empirical Evidence 
A large portion of the empirical studies examining the relationship between greater 
representation of women on boards and firm financial performance discussed in Chapter 1, did not 
account for a critical mass of women being present on the board.317 The majority of studies which 
account for critical mass and those which examine the relationship between critical mass and board 
processes as well as firm financial performance find a positive relationship both between female 
representation and enhanced board processes, and female representation and firm financial 
performance. Critical mass may be crucial to understanding these relationships and may also 
provide an explanation as to why empirical studies which do not account for this variable lead to 
such mixed results.  
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3.1.3.1 What Constitutes a Critical Mass? 
An empirical study conducted by Torchia, Calbro & Huse,318 examined what a “critical 
mass” of female directors on a corporate board means. 319 Torchia et al used survey based data 
from Norwegian firms from the years 2005-2006.320 Theoretically underpinning Torchia et al’s 
study is Kanter’s critical mass theory as described above. When the size of a minority group 
reaches a point where this group is no longer tokens, its relationship with the majority changes 
markedly. Its influence in the larger group increases a great deal. 321  
This leads directly into the authors’ question, that is, what exactly is this critical mass 
threshold? Through interviews and discussions with 50 female directors, their findings point to 
critical mass being reached when there are three or more women present on the board.322 When 
there is only one woman, or even two women present, they are assumed to be tokens, or to 
represent all women. They do not have much impact on corporate decisions or firm innovation.323 
However, once three or more female directors are present on a board, it was found that these 
women were able to express their views freely.324 
Torchia et al’s results are supported by Kramer, Konrad and Erkut’s qualitative study. In 
interviewing female directors from Fortune 1000 corporations, these authors found that when there 
was one woman on a board, or even two, these women often felt less confident and comfortable 
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voicing their ideas.325 Even when they did speak up, there were many respondents who felt their 
ideas would be ignored and later repeated by a man on the board who would be congratulated.326 
While this improved with two women on the board, and some subjects reported that the entire 
board culture became more collaborative in nature, particularly in the case of smaller boards, there 
were still reports of tokenism and the women were often viewed as interchangeable. One female 
director reported for instance, “I raised a question at a board meeting that caused the board to take 
some important action. Later on, the board chair thanked the other woman for raising the 
question.”327 Once the board reached the threshold of three or more female directors a 
transformation was reported to have taken place. Being a woman was normalized. “Three is like 
three legs on a stool. Strong. It is clear you are not there because of gender but because of talents,” 
said one of the respondents.328 The female directors felt confident to associate with the other 
females, and to voice their opinions. Further, Kramer et al note that what was not reported of 
boards with three or more women was stereotyping and the female directors’ ideas being ignored 
or later repeated by male colleagues.329  
 
3.1.3.2 The Advantages of Critical Mass: from Board Processes to Firm-Wide Benefits 
a) A More Active Board Leading to Enhanced Financial Performance 
Schwartz-Ziv conducted an empirical study which examined both the effect of critical mass 
on inner-board processes and whether having a critical mass of women on the board translates into 
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overall enhanced firm performance. She used data from the minutes of boardroom meetings and 
board committee meetings of Government Business Companies (GBC) in Israel between 2007 and 
2009.330 This method was selected because the specific actions of boards and their committees 
cannot be gleaned from public disclosure documents.331 Using board minutes allows for 
observations to be made of the contributions of directors at the meetings themselves. GBCs have 
been gender balanced (with approximately 37% female representation) for 20 years.332 Further, 
GBCs are mandated by law to maximize profits,333 so there is no debate about the role of the board.  
First, Schwartz-Ziv observed that gender balance had an impact on the inner-working of 
the board itself. The results of this study indicated that the board was more active when there was 
a critical mass of both genders present, measured by attendance at meetings.334 A critical mass of 
women is positively and significantly related to a board requesting further information from 
management (a critical mass of male directors is also positively but not significantly related to 
this).335 Secondly, financial performance seemed to be affected by the gender balance of the board. 
It was found, as previously discussed, that the average ROE336 was higher when a critical mass of 
female directors was represented on the board than without. Net profits were found to be three 
times as large when there was a critical mass of female directors present.337 This relationship was 
not linear or U-shaped.338 This is consistent with the notion that adding women to the board does 
not have a direct impact on the board’s activities, or financial performance, until a certain threshold 
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is reached. The impact of female representation is catalyzed once the board hits a threshold of 
female directors.  
 Schwartz-Ziv addresses the possibility of endogeneity and reverse causality.339 She states 
that, while it is possible that these problems exist, it is more likely that gender balanced boards 
lead to higher profits and ROE. The combination of the causal positive relation between gender-
balanced boards and the frequency with which they take action implies that the positive impact of 
a critical mass of female directors “trickles up” to firm financial performance generally.340 It is 
also noted by the author of this study that many previous studies examine boards with an average 
of less than 10% female members.341 This may explain the mixed results discussed in Chapter 1.  
b) From Enhanced Board Strategic Tasks to Organizational Innovation 
Torchia et al found that there was a significant and positive link between a critical mass of 
female directors and organizational innovation, mediated by board strategic tasks. Firm innovation 
is defined as a company’s “commitment to create and introduce new products, processes and 
organizational systems”.342 Board strategic tasks refers to the extent to which board members are 
engaged in the “strategic process.” “Hence, board strategic involvement covers corporate mission 
development, strategy conception and formulation, and strategy implementation.”343 This 
relationship does not exist when women are only represented in token amounts. The authors use 
Kanter’s theory to explain why one or two women, because of increased visibility and 
stereotyping, will likely not have an impact on board strategic tasks or on firm organization. Once 
there are three women present on the board, or once a critical mass is reached, female directors 
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feel freer to express their views and the authors speculate that this leads to the consideration of a 
broader range of alternatives, enhanced decision making and so enhanced board strategic tasks. 
The authors argue that better decision making and board strategic tasks as a result of increased 
gender balance, leads to enhanced firm innovation. 344  
c) Enhanced Advice and Monitoring and Enhanced Firm Performance 
Bruno et al also note that very few companies had a critical mass of female directors until 
very recently, which could have skewed results of past inquiries.345 The theory being examined in 
this study is whether female board representation increases shareholder value by improving the 
board’s advising and monitoring roles.346 This study used data from 2,219 Italian companies listed 
on the Italian Stock Exchange from 2008-2016.347 A mandatory quota was introduced in 2012 
requiring listed companies to have gender balanced boards by 2018, or face potentially harsh 
consequences. 348  
The results of this study support critical mass theory. The data produced a distinct U-shape 
when graphed. The effect of female presence was found to be negatively related to firm 
performance, measured by ROE, ROA, ROIC and ROS,349 when 10% of the board was female; 
their effect was insignificant at 20%; but when female directors accounted for more than 20% of 
board seats, the effect was significantly positive.350 Thus, as in Schwartz-Ziv’s study, once female 
representation reaches a specific threshold, women’s presence on the board is positively and 
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significantly related to firm financial performance. Before this critical mass threshold is reached, 
their presence is insignificant, and in very small numbers may actually be negatively related to 
financial performance. This supports the results in studies conducted before gender balanced 
boards became common, where a negative relationship was found between greater female board 
representation (greater, but still below critical mass) and firm financial performance. In theory, the 
authors note, “the link between women representation and shareholder value draws from the 
influence that board composition might have on the way the board addresses its monitoring and 
advising functions, which in turn affect performance”.351 The authors further point out that with 
the increase in female directors, there was a decrease in interlocking or non-independent 
directors.352 Their data, they speculate, may be a result of female board contributions.353 One might 
predict, therefore, that the difference made by enhanced female representation on a board enhances 
the board’s advisory and monitoring function because female directors tend to be more engaged 
in monitoring than their male counterparts (perhaps by virtue of being more independent).354 This 
is supported by Konrad, Kramer and Erkut’s study, described above. Generally, the study’s 
respondents found that a significant change occurred with three female board members, leading to 
a board which listened more attentively and monitored management more vigorously by asking 
more questions of them.355 
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d) Norwegian Studies: a Big Problem for Critical Mass Theory? 
Two studies may pose real concerns for proponents of critical mass theory. For instance, 
as described in Chapter 1, Ahern and Dittmar356 using data relating to 248 Norwegian public 
companies between 2001 and 2009 (before and after the quota’s implementation in 2006), found 
the mandatory gender quota to have a large, negative impact on firm value.357 Market prices 
dropped for those firms which had had no female directors prior to the quota after they announced 
that they would be adding women to their boards.358 On top of this downturn, there was evidence 
that the quota had a negative impact on Tobin’s Q, with losses of more than 20% in some cases.359 
Matsa and Miller using similar data reached similar results. They found that between 2006 and 
2009 female board representation doubled among the firms subject to the quota.360 Using a panel 
of 104 listed Norwegian companies from 2003 to 2009,361 these authors found that the impact of 
the quota on profit was negative and significant.362  
The authors of these studies explain their results in contradictory ways. Ahern and Dittmar 
attribute the Norwegian losses following the implementation of the quota to the fact that boards 
were forced to include women with less executive experience, including much less CEO 
experience than their male counterparts.363 Matsa and Miller disagree. They argue that the lower 
short-term gains are actually due to the difference between male and female director preferences. 
Boards in Norway on average remained stable in both average age and average experience, even 
with the addition of younger females with less CEO experience. Instead, they say, women tend to 
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be more long-term and stakeholder oriented. They are on average more altruistic and less 
concerned with short-term profits than men. This is evidenced by the fact that the Norwegian 
boards with more female directors during the sample period were less inclined to undertake large 
layoffs even during a recession. This strategy may save money for the shareholders in the future 
because once demand is renewed, firms will not have to spend money on hiring and training new 
employees. Thus, the “female style” may lead to short-term losses, but long-term gains.364 
Importantly, both Matsa and Miller and Ahern and Dittmar’s data was based on a specific time in 
Norway when the implementation of a mandatory quota led to significant board composition 
transformations almost overnight. They may not therefore, truly represent the affect a critical mass 
of women has on a board and a firm as a whole if the transformation is more gradual.365  
3.1.4 Criticism of Critical Mass Theory 
 
“Critical mass is hot. But is it real?”366 Women, when they are the minority in a male-
dominated context, are caught between two seemingly opposing ideas. The first is that they are 
just as capable as men and on their own are effective and competent members of a group. The 
second is that it makes a positive difference if there is more than one woman promoted to 
leadership positions.367 Broome and Krawiec critique critical mass theory as it applies to women 
on corporate boards because all of the respondents in their study who were first-and-only female 
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directors felt strongly that they were effective and competent board members despite being the 
lone woman.368 Perhaps the key word here is “despite”. Konrad, Kramer and Erkut, for instance 
note that their female director respondents felt that as lone women they were highly visible, that 
they would not be given the benefit of the doubt due to their gender, and that this meant they must 
work much harder than the men and come to meetings extremely prepared. They were successful 
board members in spite of their gender.369 All of these feelings were also expressed by female 
director respondents in Broome and Krawiec’s own study.370  
The transformative difference of having three or more women can be seen both in the 
individual female director’s experience, and in the board’s overall dynamic and decision-making 
processes. While the individual female director may be an effective board member, just as any 
male director with similar skills and experience would be, having three or more women may simply 
alleviate the pressure this lone woman feels at an individual level. Beyond the experience of the 
individual female director, a larger transformation occurs in the overall board dynamic when a 
critical mass of women is reached. The board, as described by participants of both Kramer et al, 
and Dhir’s study, undergoes what respondents refer to as “a dynamic shift” from competitive to 
more collaborative discussions.371  Men begin to ask more questions and more options are 
considered and listened to with greater openness, thus increasing the likelihood that the board 
makes a better decision.372 Further, as found by Adams and Ferreira, women tend to have fewer 
attendance problems than their male counterparts and as the number of females increases on a 
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board, the male attendance problems decrease.373 The monitoring and advisory functions are 
thought to be enhanced by a critical mass of female directors on the board as well. Lastly, the 
board strategic tasks seem to be improved by a critical mass of female directors.374 Thus, perhaps 
the two notions above are not so contradictory after all. It is possible both to be a qualified and 
capable board member as a singular woman, but it may make a transformative difference to the 
board process in general when there is a critical mass of female members present. This 
transformative difference in board process is suggested by the above authors to lead to firm-wide 
benefits including increased ROE, ROA, ROS, ROIC, net profits, and firm innovation.  
Critics of mandatory quotas often employ the Norwegian studies as examples of why quotas 
are harmful both to the firms forced to comply with them and for the economy generally. These 
studies certainly do not advance the case for proponents of critical mass and regulatory quotas. 
However, both Schwartz-Ziv’s evidence of gender balanced boards which have been balanced for 
many years, and her point that the Norwegian evidence is of limited value is quite persuasive.375 
Critical mass theory alone may not provide the entire explanation for the interaction of men and 
women on corporate boards and their impact on corporate actions. Let us turn now to the impact 
risk and hubris may have upon board action and overall firm performance. 
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3.2 “EGO”: HUBRIS AND RISK 
 
3.2.1 Hubris Hypothesis 
Takeover activity, particularly hostile takeover activity, 376 exploded in the 1980s.377  
Richard Roll proposed the Hubris Hypothesis in 1986. 378 Underlying this hypothesis is the idea 
that gains from takeovers, if there are any at all, have been overestimated. This theory focuses on 
the takeover process and specifically the valuation of the target company’s stock which has an 
apparent and observable market price.379 Bidding corporations tend to subscribe to the idea that 
takeovers will result in synergies, tax advantages, and other potential benefits.380 However, Roll 
asks whether there really are potential benefits resulting from a takeover. If not, the takeover 
premium would be what he calls a “random” error made by the bidding firm. The question then 
becomes if takeovers offer no value, why do bidding firms engage in bids at all? Many advance 
the argument, Roll describes, that the market behaves as if it is made up of rational beings. Another 
explanation for how the market moves is that it is composed of extremely irrational individuals, 
the behaviour of which is cumulatively cancelled out. Psychologists, Roll goes on, have been 
providing evidence to economists that individuals are not rational actors for years. Takeovers 
reflect the fact that individuals are irrational if it is the case that they do not provide benefits to the 
bidder.381  
If there are in fact not total gains in a takeover, then the existence of takeovers would be a 
result of the bidder’s overconfidence that its valuations of the target’s value are correct. In a 
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takeover, the first bidder, says Roll, is the market. The acquiring firm should be well aware of what 
is known as the “winner’s curse”.382 The winner’s curse is a phenomenon whereby on average 
winners of an auction overpay for the target’s shares. If properly accounted for, the successful 
bidder should be correct in its assessment of the asset’s value (the asset being the shares of the 
target firm). To avoid falling victim to the winner’s curse, a bidder should attempt to pay the lowest 
acceptable amount while still winning the auction (or launching a successful bid).383 To do this, a 
bidder would normally need to “subtract some amount from its valuation,”384 or lower its bid.  
Bidding firms though, according to Rolls, do not incorporate the winner’s curses properly into 
their valuations and so tend to pay more for the target shares than they are worth.385 The total 
combined takeover gain to both the target and bidder’s shareholders is nonpositive.386 Roll shows 
this to be the case with a review of the literature. On balance, empirical evidence illustrates that 
the existence of gains or losses to both remains unclear387 which still supports his hypothesis.  
Keeping in mind that takeovers do not seem to result in net gains for either the target388 or 
the bidder, hubris provides an explanation as to why bidders do not abandon their bids. Bidders’ 
valuations of targets are based on positive errors. Thus, due to the overconfidence of bidders, their 
need to acquire a target company they have set their sights on and because the winner’s curse is 
not properly accounted for, overall takeovers do not lead to shareholder wealth. Roll states that 
there is no definitive empirical evidence to eliminate this theory.389 
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Roll did not apply his theory to the issue of underrepresentation of women on boards. 
However, at the time he was writing, large, public boards would have been composed almost 
entirely, if not entirely, of men.390 It is fairly simple to extend his hubris hypothesis which at least 
at the time, would have been based upon data from almost exclusively male boards. The question 
is then, does this theory also illuminate the value of women on boards? Put differently, is it possible 
that by increasing women’s representation on boards, firms may realize additional benefits because 
female directors are not as risk prone and overconfident as their male counterparts? According to 
the evidence, the answer to this question seems to be yes. 
3.2.2 Risk Aversion  
 
Women tend to be more risk averse than men.391 This has been found to be true in many 
contexts, including in financial decision making.392 There are a number of explanations for the 
conclusion that men are more risk prone than women.  
One is that those with greater levels of testosterone tend to be less risk averse. 
According to a new breed of researchers from the field of behavioral finance, Wall 
Street’s volatility is really driven by our body chemistry. It’s the chemicals pulsing 
                                               
390 In 1984 it was reported that women occupied 3.6% of Fortune 500 board seats, see Dan R. Dalton and Catherine 
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through traders’ veins that propel them to place insane bets and enable bank executives to 
make risky decisions—and those same chemicals tend to have the same effect on 
everyone... And because the vast majority of these traders and finance executives are 
men, the most important chemical in question is testosterone.393 
By virtue of the fact that men on average have greater levels of testosterone, this may 
explain why men are less risk averse than their female counterparts.394 There are those who have 
drawn a connection between high levels of testosterone and the financial crisis. Famously, 
Christine Lagarde said: “If Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters, today’s economic crisis 
clearly would look quite different.”395  
Another explanation is that risk assessment is influenced by social factors. According to 
this theory, men and women perceive risk differently because of social differences, affect, and 
worldviews. 396 Slovic argues that gender (among other attributes) is correlated strongly with risk 
judgments.397 In a study of risk assessment in 1,512 Americans who were asked to rank items in 
terms of hazardousness, the percentage of high risk responses was greater for women on every 
item. However, it seemed that socialization was responsible for the differences between white 
males and the other participants. The response difference between white males and white females, 
for instance, did not exist for non-white males and non-white females. The risk-perception scores 
were linked with education, income and political leanings.398 From these results, it seems that 
socialization rather than just biological differences may contribute to risk aversion.  
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Yet another explanation for their greater risk aversion is that women are less overconfident 
than their male counterparts.399 Overconfidence can take two forms, according to Levi, Li and 
Zhang. Women more often view their predictions of the future both in less favourable terms, and 
as less precise than men view their future predictions.400 This is not to say that women are not 
overconfident at all, just that they are less so than men. Overconfidence, studies reveal, is greatest 
in tasks which are difficult in nature and those that do not lead to clear and immediate feedback 
(such as a merger or acquisition).401 
3.2.3 Mergers and Acquisitions 
If the hubris hypothesis is to be accepted, that is, if we accept that bidding corporations 
overpay for the shares of target corporations due to hubris, does the composition of the bidding 
corporation’s board have any bearing on this hypothesis? According to at least one empirical study, 
the answer is yes. In this study, Levi et al using data from the S&P 1500 from 1997-2009 found 
that increasing the gender balance on boards seems to impact mergers and acquisitions in two 
important ways. Firstly, as the representation of women on boards is increased, the acquisitiveness 
of a bidding company decreases. Specifically, the fraction of female board representation being 
increased by 10% was related to a reduction in the number of bids by 7.5%.402 This, the authors 
note, is consistent with women having less overconfidence than men. Secondly, the gender 
diversity on the board of bidders was found to be related significantly and negatively to the size of 
                                               
399 It is not clear whether this overconfidence is a result of social or biological differences. For the purpose of this 
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bid premiums. A 10% increase in female board representation corresponded with a 13.3% 
reduction in the bid premium.403  
 Aside from the impact of the board’s composition on mergers and acquisitions, there is 
also evidence that the gender makeup of management can have an impact upon the acquisitiveness 
of a corporation. Credit Suisse’s 2016 report demonstrates that in cases where a female CEO 
replaces a male CEO, mergers and acquisitions tend to decrease and divestitures tend to increase.404 
They found that those corporations worldwide with enhanced female representation in 
management saw better returns at lower risk.405 Similar results were discovered by Huang & 
Kisgen whose data suggested that male managers overestimate Net Present Values (NPVs) of 
transactions. They tend to engage in more transactions because they extend the pool of acceptable 
deals to include those that in fact have negative NPVs and are value destroying for shareholders. 
These authors also explained these findings in terms of overconfidence, namely that men exhibit 
greater overconfidence than women. 406 To confirm that it was overconfidence rather than other 
factors which led to these results, Huang and Kisgen conducted additional tests, including earnings 
forecasting and the career outcomes for male and female CEOs and CFOs. Each of these additional 
tests confirmed that male executives tend to be more overconfident than their female 
counterparts.407 While the focus of this paper is on the gender composition and actions of the board, 
as previously mentioned, greater gender diversity on boards tends to be followed by greater gender 
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diversity in management.408 So perhaps enhanced board gender diversity may in turn lead to a 
management team which is less overconfident.  
The hubris hypothesis seems to be supported by empirical evidence. As the overconfidence 
of the board in general is lowered, the bid premiums and the acquisitiveness of the bidding 
corporation are lowered. Thus, perhaps female board members are particularly valuable in the 
context of evaluating mergers and acquisitions, especially if one holds a shareholder-centric view 
of the board’s role.  
3.2.4 Insolvency, Fraud and Scandal  
The confidence gap may reach further than just mergers. It may also influence corporate 
disasters. Empirical evidence suggests that the greater number of female directors a board has, the 
lower the firm’s chances are of insolvency, fraud and scandal. In a study of over 900,000 limited 
companies in the United Kingdom using data from 2007 to 2008, Wilson and Altanlar found 
evidence of a relationship between the gender composition of boards and the risk of insolvency.409 
They conclude that having female directors on a board reduces the risk that the firm will become 
insolvent.410 One explanation provided by these authors for their results is gendered difference in 
preference and behaviour. Men are more likely to take excessive risks which could lead to either 
higher profits or a greater chance of insolvency.411 Their results are consistent with other studies 
finding that males are more prone to overconfidence and that they are more likely to overestimate 
the precision of their information.412 Companies with at least three female directors (a critical 
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mass) have been found to have come through the financial crisis better than those with fewer than 
three females on their boards.413 
In another study it was found that female directors lead to the reduction of both the occurrence 
and the severity of securities fraud.414 In a large sample of Chinese companies it was found that as 
the proportion of female board members increased, the likelihood of fraud decreased. 415 Similarly, 
as the proportion of female directors increased, the severity of the fraud which did occur in this 
sample was reduced.416 The relationship was found to be a non-linear, U-shape where the greatest 
reduction of fraud was correlated with the most balanced representation of men and women on 
boards.417 The authors connect their results to the theory that women are more risk-averse and less 
overconfident than men and so are less likely to engage in fraud purposefully.418 
Even in situations where no intentional fraud occurs, Johnson outlines that the overconfidence 
of financial market participants could lead to overly risky behaviour.419 Johnson argues that risk 
management may provide the most significant rationale for diversifying boards.420 The elimination 
of groupthink (as discussed in Chapter 1) not only leads to a wider range of perspectives brought 
to bear on decisions being made, but also enhances risk management and oversight of 
executives.421  
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Thus perhaps there are inherent differences (either biological or as a result of socialization) in 
male and female directors which can lead to attitudes and decisions that have a serious impact on 
shareholder wealth. 
3.2.5 Systemic Risk and the OSC’s Mandate 
 
If there is a difference between risk aversion in men and women which may impact on 
shareholder wealth, insolvency, and fraud, could risk appetite have an influence on financial 
institutions and the capital markets more generally? Put another way, could gender balance reduce 
systemic risk? Systemic means of or pertaining to a system.422 Systemic risk is defined in several 
ways. Some define it as the “chain-like” risk of failure among institutions and market participants 
which could be harmful to the whole financial system.423 Others define it as the risk of one market 
participant defaulting on a contractual obligation leading to other participants’ failure to meet their 
obligations. Again, these defaults cause a domino effect leading to greater and greater financial 
difficulties. Yet another definition of systemic risk involves an economic shock leading to extreme 
volatility in asset prices, liquidity, bankruptcies and efficiency losses.424 As Anand and Schwarcz 
summarize, a common theme in these definitions is a specific activating event which leads to a 
“domino effect”.425  
While regulation of systemic risk may be disruptive to the natural and efficient growth of 
markets,426 the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has recognized the 
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importance thereof since 1998 (IOSCO principles Sept. 1998).427 Because individual market 
participants do not have adequate incentives to limit their risk-taking in order to decrease systemic 
risk, the benefits of a state-led approach to reduce systemic breakdowns outweighs the costs.428 
The Ontario Securities Commission updated its objectives to include the reduction of systemic risk 
in 2017.429 And the Ontario Securities Act was amended in the same year to add a reference to the 
reduction of systemic risk to the purpose of the Act.430 Thus, the reduction of systemic risk was 
not a part of the OSC’s mandate when the gender diversity policy contained in NI 58-101F1 was 
implemented in 2014.  
Given what is known about risk propensity in men and women, could all-male boards be 
contributing, rather than detracting from systemic risk? Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn examined the 
question of whether or not board configuration of US financial institutions leading up to the 
financial crisis had an impact upon subprime lending. Their results indicated that board gender 
diversity was inversely related to the decision to heavily engage in subprime lending during the 
relevant time period (1997-2005).431 This relationship was found to be negative and significant.432 
More research is needed to definitively show whether gender balance (and specifically whether a 
greater number of female directors present on financial institutions’ boards) leads to a reduction 
in systemic risk. However, this may be a question that the OSC should examine. Furthermore, 
given that it is within the Commission’s mandate, it may be a question which must be examined.  
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3.2.6 Risk Aversion Skepticism 
 
Adams and Ragunathan examine the “Lehman Sisters” hypothesis. They find that men and 
women in finance do not show much difference in risk aversion.433 These authors warn against 
generalizing about gender differences from the main population to a subpopulation of women. 
Most of the studies finding that women are more risk averse than men used the general population 
or undergraduate students.434 Women in finance tend to be quite different from women in the 
general population and evidence in this study finds that women in finance tend to be far more risk 
prone than the general population of women.435 Furthermore, gender diverse bank boards do not 
seem to engage in less risky behaviour than those with less diversity.436 
Two important points must be made regarding this study. First, the authors do note that 
gender diversity seems to make a difference in the financial performance of these large banks 
during the financial crisis. Those with more gender diverse boards tended to have a higher Tobin’s 
Q and a lower portion of non-performing loans than those banks with less gender diverse boards. 
To explain this result, Adams and Ragunathan point to evidence that women show greater concern 
for stakeholders and so in times of crisis, boards with more women do not lose the trust of their 
stakeholders.437 Second, this study is not inconsistent with critical mass theory. The average bank 
board at the time the data was collected had eleven directors, one of which, or 9.5% of which were 
female. On average these boards did not have a critical mass of female directors and were for the 
most part male. According to critical mass theory, one woman or even two, may not make much 
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of a difference in the board’s decision making process. The authors do acknowledge that their 
results may be driven by tokenism; however, they argue that this is unlikely because of the 
difference in financial performance that the female directors seem to make.438 They conclude with 
a statement that gender diversity may be important for the financial industry in times of crisis, 
although they do not believe that greater gender diversity would have prevented the financial crisis 
because of the lack of difference between male and females risk appetite in the financial 
industry.439  
3.3 “UPGRADE U”: THE BUSINESS CASE—IS IT POSSIBLE TO RESTATE?  
 
 “[C]urrent research does not really support a business case for board gender quotas. But 
it does not provide a case against quotas either. There is little hope that any (credible) 
research will ever do so. Causal effects will always be too hard to estimate…”440 
 
The business case in support of women’s enhanced representation on corporate boards is 
very popular. It has been employed by many, including organizations such as Catalyst,441 
institutional investors,442 academics,443 and policy makers444 to support initiatives to increase board 
diversity. However, as was detailed in Chapter 1, there remains serious doubt with respect to the 
underlying empirical evidence upon which the business case is supposedly based. From the glacial 
pace at which Canadian public boards are adding female directors, one can see that the business 
case rhetoric has not convinced those responsible for making board nominations. If those at the 
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top of Canadian reporting issuers were convinced that female directors enhanced firm financial 
performance or corporate governance, then one would expect to have seen women’s representation 
increase at a much more rapid pace. 
The empirical evidence supporting both critical mass and the hubris and risk aversion 
theories, while inconsistent, does not in any way eliminate the business case. In fact, it tends to 
favour the business case when a critical mass is accounted for. At the very least, there seems to be 
a weak business case supporting greater gender diversity on boards. The empirical evidence 
suggests that when there is a critical mass of female directors (that being three or more) present on 
a board, the firm’ financial performance benefits. The reason why previous studies may have had 
varying results, as mentioned, could be because until recently (and excluding the Norwegian 
experience) boards have not had three or more women present. These financial benefits stemming 
from the presence of a critical mass of female directors may be as a result of less risk aversion and 
less overconfidence. As discussed above, women tend to be more risk averse and less 
overconfident than their male counterparts.445 This leads to shareholders benefits, or at least, to 
fewer losses for shareholders. The evidence indicates that once a critical mass is reached 
boardroom culture shifts.446 The board transforms into a collaborative group with fewer attendance 
problems447, with a culture of compliance448 and less competitiveness.449 
Furthermore, boards with adequate female representation are less likely to engage in 
takeovers which lead to shareholder losses. These boards tend to be less acquisitive in nature and 
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as more female directors are present, the bid premium decreases by a significant amount.450 Thus, 
these firms are less likely to destroy shareholder value. Aside from the financial performance 
benefits that a critical mass of female directors may bring, there is also a further benefit of having 
adequate representation of women on public boards. This benefit manifests as a firm being less 
likely to engage in fraud451, fall into insolvency452, or be embroiled in corporate scandal.453  
Skepticism about the effects of critical mass and the hubris hypothesis as they relate to 
enhanced female representation on boards, do not seem to be supported by the preponderance of 
the evidence.   However, it still may not be possible to definitively restate the business case so that 
it appeals logically to those in the business world. Unlike agency theory which is based on one 
cogent narrative that seems to make complete sense, the business case is composed of several 
iterations and more than one competing narrative. What is the difference that women make and 
how? This question can be answered by a multitude of empirical studies examining different 
variables and drawing a multitude of conclusions. 
 Perhaps most troubling for proponents of the business case though is the near impossibility, 
if not sheer impossibility, of demonstrating clearly that if there is a transformation of board 
process, this leads to organizational benefits.454 It is very difficult to draw a clear connection 
between what goes on at the board level and how this may impact profits, or other measures of 
firm performance. Although a number of the above studies (like Schwartz-Ziv’s) address this 
concern, there is still a fair amount of doubt that the observed transformation in the board’s 
composition and processes have any real effect on the overall performance of the corporation. This 
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criticism is persuasive and may be crucial to the explanation for why the business case for women 
on boards has not garnered more traction.  The causal chain is simply too complex. However, this 
same complex causal chain should also represent a problem for agency theory and it appears not 
to have.  
Beyond the private sector, as argued in Chapter 2, it is not clear whether Canadian 
securities regulators themselves, while they justified the board diversity disclosure policy with 
business case rationales, are convinced by the business case in its current iterations. The diversity 
disclosure policy found in NI 58-101F1 seems to have originated first out of an equity-based 
concern for gender equality. Systemic risk reduction has been added to the OSC’s mandate. They 
therefore are required to contribute to its reduction. Given the evidence that risk appetite may have 
contributed to systemic risk leading up to the financial crisis, the OSC may re-examine what they 
are truly regulating with the gender diversity policy and why. If board diversity is a possible way 
to reduce systemic risk, the OSC may be required to consider whether their gender diversity policy 
is furthering this part of their mandate and whether it could if amended. 
From the preponderance of the evidence, the best functioning boards appear to be those 
with gender balance. This conclusion is consistent with both the hubris hypothesis and critical 
mass theory. Of course, it is not always beneficial for corporations and directors to avoid risks; 
however, it is not beneficial to take so many risks that they destroy share prices and the financial 
markets themselves. Further empirical research regarding the value to corporations of having a 
critical mass of female directors and the relative risk aversion of male and female directors should 
be pursued as public boards in the US and Canada are beginning to diversify. Such research could 
ultimately yield a unified business case theory which is persuasive to both regulators and corporate 
decision makers. 
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4 Chapter 4: “I Know You Care”: The Normative Case  
 
“For if those who support diversifying corporate boards do so because they believe diversity to be a 
worthy value in its own right, then the arguments about whether diversification enriches 
shareholders would seem to be a necessary intellectual justification, but not one of significant 
concern.”455 
As described in Chapter 1, there are many reasons to avoid using purely business case 
rationales to justify diversity efforts. For one, these rationales are not based on definitive empirical 
evidence and so have yet to be effective in persuading boards to actually diversify. For another, 
implied within justifications that diversification leads to wealth is that these efforts would not be 
worth pursuing otherwise.456 In this sense, the business case “belittles” or “cheapens” boardroom 
diversity initiatives.457 It may be useful therefore to focus on what Rosenblum calls the “normative 
case” for board gender diversity.  
This chapter will begin with an argument that in Canada, and even in the US where it is often 
assumed that a corporation’s exclusive or primary purpose is to generate shareholder wealth, 
directors acting in accordance with their fiduciary duties are at the very least permitted, and may 
be required, to pursue board diversity efforts. It will move on to an argument that the normative 
case may be readily and usefully combined with business case arguments.  
The normative case for board gender diversity is based upon the idea that women should be 
represented in greater numbers on boards, not to serve as a means to an end (that is, better firm 
performance) but rather as an end in itself. The fundamental premise is that it is wrong that women 
are inadequately represented in positions of power. There are various versions of the normative 
case. One is that it is unfair to women at an individual level that they are poorly represented in the 
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upper echelons of corporate Canada given that they now represent half of the labour force and the 
majority of university graduates.458 Another version is, as previously described, that in order to 
have a legitimate economic system, we need the representation of women in positions of power.459  
It is difficult to separate the normative case from the business case because public corporate 
boards are by their very nature an integral part of for-profit businesses. A purely normative or 
social-justice based argument may not be persuasive if the role of a public corporation’s board is 
to pursue profit above all-else. Thus in order for the normative case to truly resonate, it may be 
necessary to accept a view of the board (and corporation itself) as something beyond a shareholder 
wealth maximizer.  
 
4.1 “HOLD UP”: BOARDS LEGALLY PERMITTED AND ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE 
GOALS BEYOND PROFIT OR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
“The corporate persona, however, is not so monolithic as to preclude consideration of factors besides 
the business case and profit motive.”460  
Shareholder primacy is thought to be a pervasive norm of corporate governance.461 However, 
even in the US where it is generally assumed that the shareholder primacy norm underlies 
corporate law, this norm may not actually exist in the law, and as a concept seems to be incoherent. 
Further, policies directed toward board diversity, even accepting the shareholder primacy norm, 
would be protected by the business judgment rule. In Canada, where the shareholder primacy norm 
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has not been supported by the Supreme Court, the legitimacy of board diversity policies is even 
more unassailable. 
4.1.1 The Extreme Case of Shareholder Primacy: Not So Extreme after All 
In the US context, where shareholder primacy is much more ingrained in corporate 
governance than in Canada, it is still wholly legal for corporations to pursue goals going beyond 
profit maximization. Indeed, since the Great Depression there has been controversy over whether 
corporations should operate solely for the benefit of their shareholders. Berle and Dodd’s debate 
in the 1930s raised some important points regarding corporate governance which still remain 
relevant today. Berle, for instance, was of the view that corporations are and ought to be operated 
purely for shareholders. Powers granted to the corporation, or a group within same, are at all times 
to be exercised for the benefit of the shareholders.462 If a corporate decision is to be scrutinized, it 
should be judged in its specific context with reference to whether it fairly protects shareholder 
interests.463 Dodd was critical of this view.464 He argued that it may be more appropriate to view a 
corporation as an institution run for the benefit of itself. A corporation should operate not solely 
for the benefit of shareholders, but rather as an individual would, with regard to the law and public 
opinion. Dodd identified corporate stakeholders, one of which was the general public, 465 and stated 
that “[o]ne no longer feels the obligation to take from labor for the benefit of capital, nor to take 
from the public for the benefit of both, but rather to administer wisely, fairly, and in the interest of 
all”.466  
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Easterbrook and Fischel advance a persuasive argument that the corporation is a “nexus of 
contracts”.467 They use contract law as an analogy to demonstrate the relationship between 
shareholders, directors and managers. Shareholders, they state, in exchange for bearing the residual 
risk of the firm’s actions, expect that the firm will act to maximize long-term profits, which will 
result in an increase of the share price.  These shareholders are entitled to residual claims to profit 
because they are bearing this risk. If investors are promised that profits will be maximized (or an 
attempt at maximization of profits will be made), actions in furtherance of this goal must be taken, 
or shareholders will have a cause for complaint. However, these authors note, that it should not 
matter what the purpose of a corporation is. For instance, so long as it is made clear to investors at 
the outset, it is perfectly acceptable for a newspaper publisher’s primary goal to be printing a 
newspaper, while profit remains a secondary goal. 468 They further acknowledge that society may 
impose financial penalties in order to curb corporate behaviour.469 They argue that it is better for 
corporate behaviour to be curbed by prices either increasing or decreasing, rather than for 
regulation to alter governance structure and impede a firm’s ability to maximize wealth.470 “A 
manager told to serve two masters (a little for equity holders, a little for the community) has been 
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”471 In other words, management (and presumably the 
board) cannot effectively maximize profits and consider society as a whole in every decision made, 
and be held accountable to all constituencies. Finally, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that wealth 
maximization in turn benefits social wealth. High performing firms are more likely to provide 
better working conditions and adopt environmentally friendly practices. 472 It is not difficult to 
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apply this argument to the issue of women on boards. For instance, it is clear that high performing 
firms have far more resources to devote to diversity initiatives generally and at the board level. 
Thus, profit and wealth maximization by this logic may actually further gender diversity on boards. 
Historically in the US, however, corporations were chartered with reference to the public 
interest. They were not intended to serve wholly as wealth maximizers.473 The public utility of 
business was not viewed as conflicting with private benefits. Thus it was possible for a corporation 
to operate within a shareholder primacy norm and in the public interest.474 Indeed, the “shareholder 
primacy norm may be one of the most overrated doctrines in corporate law”.475 While legal 
scholars often assume that this norm is embedded within all managerial actions, in reality this may 
not be true. In Smith’s opinion, in almost all corporate actions shareholder primacy is not 
considered by management. 476  
This could be because corporate law in the US has never obligated corporations to pursue 
shareholder wealth over and above all else.477 State corporation codes do not define the purpose of 
corporations as such. The majority of these codes actually contain provisions that explicitly allow 
boards to consider the interests of other stakeholders in making strategic decisions.478  The US 
Supreme Court has also recognized that profit may be important to corporate functioning, but may 
not be the be-all and end-all of such operation. In Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., for instance, 
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the Supreme Court stated, “[although] a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make 
money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the 
expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership 
approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such 
corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.”479   
This line of thinking may be taken one step further. Shareholder wealth maximization as a 
concept is itself undefinable.480 First of all, as Stout points out, many view shareholders as the 
owners of corporations. This is inaccurate. A corporation is a legal entity, which, like a human 
being, cannot be owned. Shareholders, rather than ownership, Stout claims, similarly to 
Easterbrook and Fischel, have a contract which allows for certain legal rights. Unlike Easterbrook 
and Fischel though, Stout argues that shareholders are not the residual claimants of the corporation, 
other than in the context of bankruptcy. The view that shareholders are the residual claimants of 
any leftover profits, Stout says is inaccurate. Furthermore she argues, they have no direct control 
over the behaviour of management or the board of directors, especially in large, widely held 
companies.481 Boards thus can choose to engage in attempts to maximize shareholder wealth, or 
pursue objectives which benefit society, while maintaining the firm itself. Furthermore, 
shareholder wealth maximization does not make sense because shareholders’ interests themselves 
differ across classes of shareholders, those who have diversified portfolios and those that do not, 
and between those who wish to sell their shares in the short term and those who wish to hold them 
for the long term.482  
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If one views a corporation and its shareholders this way, it is far easier to accept a normative 
rationale for diversifying boardrooms. Viewing shareholder wealth maximization as simply one 
possible business strategy among many, corporations should be free to pursue social goals, 
provided those are in the best interests of the firm itself. If shareholder wealth is an incoherent 
concept which a board is not required by law to pursue at all times, then there is no reason why a 
board cannot and should not pursue diversity as a goal, provided it does not harm the firm in the 
long term.  If corporations are more than able to be vehicles for positive social change, they should 
very easily be able to pursue diversity at the board level.  
On the other hand, if shareholder wealth maximization is a coherent concept to be treated as 
the board’s main mission, diversity efforts should still be protected by the business judgement rule. 
Under the business judgement rule, boards are given broad discretion in the United States.483 
Diversity proponents, therefore, should not need perfect empirical evidence to support the case for 
board diversification. Rather, they should only need persuasive arguments to be adopted by 
boards.484 The law, as Fanto et al illustrate, allows the board to take actions which are only 
tenuously related to shareholder value. There is no reason for diversity advocates not to take full 
advantage of how flexible the law is on this point. Unless convincing evidence is presented proving 
that board heterogeneity is harmful to shareholder value (which is unlikely), the law allows 
action.485  
                                               
483 The business judgement rule in the US is a standard of review applied to directorial decisions. It is “a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, Del. 
Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 811 (1984). 
484 Fanto, Solan & Darley, supra note 7 at 919. 
485 Ibid at 931. 
 103 
Thus, it may be possible that even in the United States, where it has often been assumed that 
the board’s role is primarily to pursue shareholder wealth maximization, there is at the very least 
hope for normative based rationales for board diversification. Those in favour of greater board 
diversity “should not limit themselves to the shareholder value paradigm, for it obscures the other 
perspectives and values that they offer to justify board diversity and reinforces that paradigm.” 
Corporate law in the United States allows directors the freedom to diversify at the board level.  
The obvious difficulty with this argument is that it is not politically appealing to those who 
accept a shareholder-centric view of the corporation. It would require a massive cultural shift and 
change in perspective in the United States where shareholder primacy is still very much embedded 
in corporate governance rhetoric. In Canada however, shareholder primacy is not so deep-seated 
in corporate governance. 
4.1.2 Canada 
As previously described in Chapter 1, Canadian boards are permitted and encouraged to 
approach decisions in a stakeholder friendly manner. Directors have a duty of loyalty which 
requires that they act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation.486 Directors thus owe a duty at all times to the corporation itself, not to shareholders 
in particular.  
Even prior to the recent amendments to the CBCA, the Canadian Supreme Court has stated 
that in discharging their fiduciary duty to the corporations they serve, directors may consider the 
interests of various stakeholders even in Revlon-type situations.487 However, there is no guidance 
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on how seriously other stakeholders’ interests must be considered, and given the strength of the  
business judgement rule, 488 directors are not likely to be penalized for prioritizing shareholder 
wealth. Professor Puri notes that the BCE decision did not provide directors with guidance about 
how to balance the interests of various stakeholders in making challenging decisions.489 It leaves 
the decision of how to balance these rights entirely up to directors, rather than the court, while 
simultaneously leaving the door open for boards to prioritize stakeholders. The expansive 
statement of the business judgement rule in the BCE case essentially protects directors’ decisions 
from review by the court.490 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the CBCA was recently amended to 
essentially codify the BCE decision.491 Commenters remain unconvinced as to whether these 
amendments will impact the behaviour of directors in any way.492  
One can imagine possible cases where the interests of the corporation diverge from the 
interests of shareholders. If the view is taken that the board is a wealth generator,493 this does not 
necessarily mean that in every instance it should maximize shareholder wealth.494 Instead, it could 
mean that it should maximize the total enterprise value of the corporation. We know from BCE 
and Peoples495 that Canadian directors are given broad discretion. The business judgement rule 
should protect them from the charge of violating their fiduciary duties, provided they uphold what 
                                               
488 For description, see supra note 208. 
489 Poonam Puri, “The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 427 at 430. 
490 Ibid at 431–434. 
491 Canada Bill C-97, supra note 182 at section 141.  
492 “Significant Amendments to CBCA Proposed in 2019 Federal Budget”, online: 
<https://www.dwpv.com:443/en/Insights/Publications/2019/Amendments-to-CBCA-in-Federal-Budget>. 
493See William Bratton, “Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights” (1993) 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, online: <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/907>.  
494 Sarra, supra note 100 at 1139. 
495 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2004 SCC 68 [“Peoples”]. In 
interpreting the business judgement rule in this case, the Supreme Court stated: “Courts are ill-suited and should be 
reluctant to second-guess the application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate 
decision making…” at para 67. 
 105 
they consider in their judgement to be the best interests of the corporation, even if this means not 
always prioritizing shareholder wealth maximization.496  
Permitting directors to consider other interests and pursue goals beyond profit and 
shareholder wealth maximization, does not require them to do so. At the very least though, it is 
difficult not to recognize that in Canada directors are more than able to pursue goals which go 
beyond making a profit. So long as the directors believe that diversity would be in the best interests 
of the corporation, board diversity efforts would certainly be among these acceptable goals. 
Furthermore, as specified by the Supreme Court, “acting as a good corporate citizen”497 
undoubtedly would include the pursuit of diversity goals. Thus, corporations are more than 
welcome to prioritize diversity and pursue it at the board level.  
4.1.3 Accepting the Shareholder Wealth Maximization View of the Board 
Milton Friedman conceives the firm’s social responsibility as solely to increase profits.498 
The managers, as economic agents, are to fulfill the wishes of the shareholders (the supposed 
owners). Generally these wishes are fulfilled by making as much money as possible. He asserts 
that social efforts made by a corporation which diminish shareholders’ returns are akin to an 
unacceptable form of taxation, as they are social initiatives paid for with other people’s money.499 
What Friedman fails to address is the idea that shareholders, aside from and including institutional 
investors, may agree with, and indeed invest in, a corporation because of its social conscience.500  
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Even if it is true instead that boards are there only to protect the interests of shareholders 
and maximize profits, given the current calls from institutional investors, greater gender diversity 
may still be an issue well within and perhaps required to be addressed by directors in their duties 
as fiduciaries. Powerful institutional investors are pushing for greater gender diversity on large 
public boards in both the United States and Canada. Some examples of these initiatives include 
BlackRock’s letter to corporations with no women directors urging them to diversify,501 ISS and 
Glass Lewis’ promises to recommend voting against nominations of directors on boards with no 
women,502 and Ontario Teachers Pension Plan’s letter to the OSC calling for companies with fewer 
than three female directors by 2020 to be delisted from the TSX.503 The Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) and Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ) are requesting boards with all men to 
diversify.504 “The responsible investment team at CDPQ now maintains a database of highly 
qualified female directors, which they send to male-dominated boards who claim such falsehoods 
[that there are no qualified women to add to the board].”505  
It is not just firms with large market capitalizations that are being pushed by institutional 
investors to diversify. In the US, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America 
(TIAA) has begun to focus its attention on firms with small to medium market capitalizations. 
During the last proxy season, TIAA reached out to 500 firms with no female directors and 
requested that they adopt search practices that require nomination pools to have diverse candidates 
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and to promise to nominate a female director in the next two years. They have stated publicly that 
if these efforts do not work, they may consider voting against directors who they view as 
responsible for the “gender gaps”. 506  While these initiatives are based in part on business case 
rationales, they are also based in morality. If we are to accept that the interests of shareholders 
should outweigh any other stakeholders, boards may still be required to diversify because this is 
what the shareholders demand.  
As described in Chapter 1 briefly, there is a great deal of debate about whether shareholder 
activism is good or bad for corporations in the long term and whether the normative leanings of 
institutional investor leaders should impact corporate governance in this way. Institutional investor 
efforts may be an efficient and cost effective way to promote board diversity. Or at the very least, 
a board decision to pre-emptively pursue diversity may be the most cost effective way to avoid 
shareholder activism.507 Not only do these initiatives place no regulatory burden on firms, they 
allow for diversity to increase at a much more rapid pace.508 Further, they address many of the 
concerns of those who oppose stronger regulation, that is, inappropriate interference from the 
regulator etc. Lastly, successful shareholder proposals may mean that those stakeholders 
concerned with diversity will be more likely to increase their holdings in companies which have 
diversified as a result of these proposals.509  
However, the question remains as to whether it is appropriate for institutional investors to 
demand that boards diversify. There are those who disagree with institutional investor involvement 
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in social issues. For instance, in 2005, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan took the position that 
non-financial considerations (such as ESG considerations) could not take priority over the risk and 
return management of the fund.510 However, as just mentioned, Teachers has since changed its 
position and even advocated for gender quotas to be required for corporations listed on the TSX. 
Moreover, if ESG requirements benefit long-term shareholder value, then this criticism becomes 
moot. Institutional investors are however using other people’s money in order to pursue a 
normative goal, one which is not clearly linked to returns for those on whose behalf they are 
investing. It is as yet unclear if shareholder activists interests align with only short-term share 
value, or if they align with the long term value of the firms which they target.511 It may therefore, 
still be appropriate for a board to recommend voting against a shareholder proposal if the directors 
believe it not to be in the best interests of the corporation in the long term.    
4.2 “1+1”: COMBINATION OF UTILITY AND MORALITY  
The business and normative cases for board gender diversity, as described in greater detail 
in Chapter 1, are extremely difficult to separate. The combination of utility and morality may, as 
Fairfax states, be inextricably linked.512 While the business case may not be persuasive as a stand-
alone justification, perhaps the normative case is not either.  
4.2.1 Directors Nominated Not on Basis of Merit   
A study of large US public companies found that on average female first-time directors were 
much more highly qualified for board membership than their male colleagues.513 Despite their 
merit, women were far less likely to be recommended for additional board seats as compared to 
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their first-time male counterparts.514 Thus, women, even at the highest levels of the corporate elite, 
still may be passed over in favour of less qualified men. The logical conclusion to be drawn from 
this is that boards are not as highly qualified as they could be and that the current nomination 
system is not truly a meritocracy. Not only is this unfair to the women who are being passed over, 
but it is hard not to conclude that boards could be made better if board nomination was truly a 
meritocratic process. 
This quantitative evidence is supported by qualitative evidence as well. In a study examining 
the opinions of those who benefited from the Norwegian quotas, Seierstad found that quotas 
became a welcome corporate governance strategy once implemented. Participants used both 
instrumental arguments and individual justice rationales to justify the usefulness of quotas.515 It 
was found that these two kinds of rationales were interrelated. That is, female directors who 
benefited from the Norwegian quotas spoke about how their talents and skills had been ignored in 
favour of mediocre men. Importantly, it was noted by this author that only two respondents relied 
entirely on fairness rationales in discussing the justification of gender quotas.516 This study 
highlights the point made above. Unfairness (that is, ignoring talented women in favour of less 
talented men) may actually have an instrumental impact on the corporation (that is, it may lead to 
less meritorious director nominations). This argument is based on a combination of morality and 
business case reasoning.  
4.2.2 Consumer and Shareholder Loyalty  
 The normative case becomes the business case in other contexts as well. It is difficult to 
ignore public opinion and social values in making corporate decisions. Rooted within every 
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corporate decision are social considerations.517 Corporate conduct which advances social goals can 
increase revenue. Consumers are often more loyal to, and willing to pay more for goods and 
services of, brands which they consider socially conscious.518 It was found in 2015 that investors 
had since 2013 contributed $8.2 billion to socially responsible stocks and bond funds. While the 
total assets in all mutual funds rose by 52% between 2012 and 2017, the assets in these socially 
conscious funds rose by 59%.519 Other studies have shown that firms with social and 
environmental policies perform better than those without. 520  Shareholders have become very 
interested in ESG reporting. There is a growing interest in ESG reporting and transparency and 
some view ESG disclosure as a proxy for management quality.521 Thus, the normative case bleeds 
into the business case. Market participants are calling for board diversity. Consumers and 
investors, while they are not the only constituencies whose interests should be considered by 
corporate directors in Canada, are willing to pay more for diversity. If share prices rise because of 
the growing demand and reward for diversity efforts, then institutional investors and boards 
themselves, even accepting the shareholder primacy norm, may be required to prioritize board 
diversity. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Canada may not reach gender parity on public corporate boards in the foreseeable future 
without at least the limited acceptance of normative based rationales justifying stronger regulation. 
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Paradoxically, while politically appealing, the business case has yet to be established empirically, 
likely because of the critical mass issue and may never be without stronger regulatory intervention 
aimed at increasing women’s board participation. The fairness based rationale for stronger 
regulation may not be able to stand alone either. Perhaps this is why the regulators have been so 
unclear about what the true purpose of NI 58-101F1’s gender diversity policy is. In order for 
stronger regulation to be justified by the normative case, we may have to view for-profit firms as 
social institutions with purposes that go beyond shareholder wealth maximization. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has already accepted a stakeholder-friendly model of the corporation, allowing 
for the board to consider interests beyond shareholder value.522 Parliament has endorsed such a 
view in the recent CBCA amendments. Combined with the stated objective of the OSC’s gender 
diversity policy, that is, to enhance female representation on reporting issuer boards, it is obvious 
that public corporations are not only permitted by law, but encouraged in many ways, to diversify 
at the board level. Regulatory amendments will be necessary to spark change and many options 
for such intervention will be presented in the following chapter. 
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5 Chapter 5 “Forward”: Barriers and Solutions Applying the Normative and 
Business Case Rationales  
 
The purpose of this paper has been to explain where the Canadian board diversity policy 
originated, the failure of this policy, the underlying theories behind regulation, their shortcomings, 
and why these theories may be useful to regulators. The intention has not been to provide a 
recommendation for the exact form an amended policy might take. However, it seems necessary 
to discuss why women are so poorly represented on public boards and the possible solutions 
regulators might apply to the barriers faced by women. Again, this chapter will apply the business 
and normative cases in order to provide possible options to the regulators. Stronger regulation is 
recommended, but the decision of what form this regulation will take should be left to the securities 
regulators.   
5.1 “PARTITION”: ROOT OF THE UNDERREPRESENTATION PROBLEM:  DEMAND 
AND SUPPLY SIDE BARRIERS523 
 
On the road to directorships women face both supply and demand-side barriers.524 Supply-
side barriers are those which come between women and becoming board-ready, while demand-
side barriers prevent those women who are qualified from sitting on boards. As their name 
suggests, supply-side barriers affect the supply of qualified female directors and demand-side 
barriers narrow the demand for female directors. The focus of this paper has been on demand-side 
solutions in the form of regulation. However, demand-side solutions may in turn work to eliminate 
supply-side barriers as well. Greater female representation at the board level may result in more 
                                               
523 For a definition and detailed explanation of supply and demand-side barriers see Patricia Gabaldon et al, 
“Searching for Women on Boards: An Analysis from the Supply and Demand Perspective" (2016) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review - Wiley Online Library, online: <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-
com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12141>. 
524 Ibid. 
 113 
flexible employment policies, less work-family conflict as well as greater numbers of female 
executive officers because more gender diverse board may be more inclined to adopt such 
policies.525   
A looming question remains on the demand-side. Are the above rationales enough to justify 
stronger regulation aimed at increasing board gender diversity? The empirical business case for 
greater representation of women on boards may not be strong enough because there have yet to be 
enough women on boards to provide the data needed to definitively make this case. And until the 
empirical case is compelling, there may not be sufficient impetus for boards to increase gender 
diversity significantly enough to furnish that data. There are those who acknowledge this cycle, 
but still believe that stronger regulation of this issue remains unwarranted.526 If we continue to 
wait for an air tight empirical business case to support stronger regulation, due to this circular 
problem, there may never come a time in Canada when women are adequately represented on 
corporate boards.  
It may be impossible to separate business case rationales from normative ones. The question 
of why women should be represented more adequately may have to be answered both in terms of 
utility and fairness. Where should the regulators go from here? One thing is clear. The policy 
contained in NI 58-101F1 in its current formulation is not advancing its stated objective.  
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5.2 “BEST THING I NEVER HAD”: DEMAND-SIDE SOLUTIONS 
 
5.2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of Quotas and Disclosure Requirements 
  
5.2.1.1 Is it the Quota or the Penalty Making the Difference? 
There is some debate about the way in which regulation motivates corporate action. A full 
picture of that debate is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, some scholars argue that regulatory 
intervention ought to be proactive in nature with a view to encouraging market participants to 
adopt the norms underlying the regulation and to develop a “culture of compliance.” 527 Others 
believe that a deterrence-based regulatory approach is more effective because issuers will violate 
regulations if they perceive the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of compliance.528  
Applied to the issue of women on boards, the question is whether regulators should 
encourage reporting issuers to adopt the underlying norms of the diversity disclosure policy, and 
hopefully increase their representation of female board members, or alternatively, whether 
regulators should implement severe enough sanctions to coerce the same result. Some commenters 
believe implementing quotas is the only way to guarantee gender diversity on boards.529 Countries 
with quotas saw dramatic increases in female board participation almost immediately when the 
sanctions were severe enough. States which have implemented comply-or-explain models have 
seen much less dramatic change. However, they have seen change. 
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Perhaps the best regulatory approach is somewhere in the middle, as suggested by 
Professor Anand.  
Legislators and regulators do not uniformly recognize that firms have incentives for 
voluntary behavior in corporate governance. It is possible to take advantage of these 
incentives by creating a governance regime that is less costly for firms, yet still protects 
investors. In particular, a partially enabling structure has the effect of minimizing costs but 
at the same time encouraging compliance.530  
Evidence from several jurisdictions seems to point to the idea that it is specific, numerical 
targets and not sanctions which make the difference. In most of the examples which were described 
in Chapter 2, when specific numeric targets are provided by regulators, corporations tend to 
diversify. Quotas with heavy sanctions for non-compliance lead to diverse boards being achieved 
rapidly, but ultimately, it may be that specific goals even within a comply-or-explain regime, are 
just as effective in the end.  
5.2.1.2 Therapeutic Disclosure  
Theoretically, disclosure based regimes work by exposing corporate governance 
deficiencies to the public.531 “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman.”532 This is what is known as “therapeutic disclosure”. 
Following NI 58-101F1’s amendment, the number of women on boards increased at a rate 
which was similar to what it was before the amendments, that is, glacial. This is because the policy 
is too weak to produce any real gains. Willey for instance calls it an “explain-or-explain” policy.533 
There are no targets provided in the national instrument with which issuers must comply. Issuers 
must explain whether or not they have, for instance, a diversity policy and if they do not, they must 
                                               
530 Anand, supra note 169 at 251. 
531 Dhir, supra note 5 at 84. 
532 Louis D Brandeis , Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York : F.A. Stokes ,1914) at 92. 
533 Willey, supra note 62 at 193. 
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explain why not.534 They must disclose how many women are on their board,535 but no suggested 
number or percentage is provided for in NI 58-101F1. What then must they comply with other than 
disclosure requirements? 
To a certain extent, the Canadian diversity disclosure policy may be an example of 
therapeutic disclosure. However, as discussed above, because the policy is not specific enough 
about what issuers should work towards, it is also ineffective at public shaming. It is arguable that 
the policy has forced those reporting issuers who previously had no or very few female directors 
to add women (or a woman) to their boards. Prior to the policy’s implementation more than half 
of reporting issuers had no female directors. Now, 66% of reporting issuers have at least one 
woman on their boards.536 Thus, by virtue of requiring disclosure of the number of women 
directors, the policy has lowered the number of public companies with entirely male boards. Given 
the overall number of women who have been added to boards and the strikingly slow pace of 
progress since its implementation, it is arguable that NI 58-101F1 is not even effective as a form 
of therapeutic disclosure.537  
Fairfax points out that issuers in North America have been more than willing to implement 
other corporate best practices, despite the mixed empirical evidence upon which they are based.538 
Yet, they remain reluctant to diversify. Perhaps this is because the diversity policies of both the 
United States and Canada are too weak.539 A solution to this would be to set measurable targets. 
                                               
534 NI 58-101F1, supra note 3 at item 11. 
535 Ibid at item 15. 
536 CSA Multilateral Staff Notice 58-310, supra note 2 at 2. Interestingly, the last Fortune 500 company to have no 
female directors recently added its first woman to the board, see Aimee Picchi, “The last S&P 500 company with an 
all-male board adds a woman”, online: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/copart-auto-auction-company-the-last-s-p-
500-company-with-an-all-male-board-adds-a-woman/>. 
537 Or perhaps therapeutic disclosure itself is not an effective means by which to steer behaviour. The broader issue 
of the efficacy of therapeutic disclosure as a regulatory tool is beyond the scope of this paper. 
538 Fairfax, supra note 22 at 878. 
539 See Foster, supra note 17; Willey, supra note 62. 
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In other words, the “comply” part of the Canadian NI 58-101F1 could require at least three540 
women on boards of a certain size and the “explain” portion could require a description of why a 
non-compliant issuer does not have this number.  
5.2.2 Regulatory Options 
If one completely accepts either the normative or the business case rationale to justify 
regulation of board gender diversity, the most efficient and appealing solution to the 
underrepresentation of women is mandatory quotas. If one does not believe that the normative case 
is enough to justify such strong regulatory intervention, a stricter comply-or-explain disclosure 
model seems to be justified by combining normative and business case justifications. Even if one 
rejects the normative case entirely and is only prepared to accept the business case, a say-on-
diversity vote, as discussed in greater detail in s.5.2.2.3 is still appropriate. Alternatively, if one 
accepts neither the business case nor the normative case, a say-on-diversity vote still seems 
warranted. 
5.2.2.1 Quotas 
a) Mandatory 
As a demand-side solution, mandatory quotas have been shown in every case to increase 
boardroom gender diversity.541 It is difficult to justify implementation of a mandatory quota 
without reference to the normative case. However, if one is prepared to entirely accept the business 
case, quotas still may be the appropriate regulatory intervention. That is, if it is true that adequate 
female representation on boards definitely provides business benefits, then quotas are one way to 
guarantee these benefits, provided they are introduced in a gradual manner and not all at once as 
                                               
540 Refer to Chapter 3 for the significance of this number. 
541 As described in Chapter 2, at section 2.4.1.1, Norway and France, after the introduction of mandatory quota laws 
with severe penalties for non-compliance saw rapid and immense gender diversity enhancements on the boards 
impacted by the quota laws. 
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they were in Norway. An important criticism of quotas is that they do not address supply-side 
problems. In other words, they do not broaden the pool of future female directors because they do 
nothing to address structural or institutional issues that limit the number of women who may serve 
on boards, such as work-family conflicts or a lack of flexible work schedules. These supply-side 
barriers which appear in the early years of women’s careers often work to prevent them from 
advancing to a stage where they would be qualified to act as a director. A further discussion of 
these barriers will follow later in this chapter. However, quotas may broaden the pool of future 
female board candidates in other ways. They do this by increasing the gender spillover into 
executive officer positions and by providing women with board experience. As previously 
described, it has been shown that firms with greater numbers of female directors are likely to have 
greater numbers of executive officers in later years.542 Quotas may be the “necessary evil” to 
change the current state of board composition.543 While certainly not the ideal solution, other 
demand-side solutions increase board diversity at such a slow pace as to make progress nearly 
imperceptible.    
Many critics who reject mandatory quotas, purport that quotas are just a way to bring down 
men. 544 This seems to be more of a distraction from what is really at issue than a valid argument. 
High achieving men who sit on boards are not those who should fear quotas. “Mediocre” men, 
who likely should not be on boards in the first place, are those whose board membership may be 
at risk.545 Quotas are not intended to remove high achieving men in favour of women who may 
                                               
542 Eastman, Rallis & Mazzucchelli, supra note 12 at 9–10; Matsa & Miller, supra note 13 at 638. 
543 Dhir, supra note 5 at 117. 
544 See Senator Frum’s arguments in Senate Debate April 2010, supra note 205 at 413 as well as Ian Maitland, “Why 
the Business Case for Diversity Is Wrong” (2018) 16 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 731. 
545 See Seierstad, supra note 365 at 399 (description of the crisis of the mediocre man). For an analogous finding of 
“mediocre” men being squeezed out of politics due to implementation of mandatory quotas see Timothy J Besley et 
al, Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden, SSRN Scholarly Paper 
ID 2465902 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2013). This study measured the competence of 
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not deserve to be on boards. They are intended to replace lower achieving men with women who 
merit board seats but would otherwise be overlooked. 
The new law will not affect the best men at all; they will still have the opportunities. What 
the law does is to “squeeze” out the mediocre men in order to exchange them with excellent 
women. The way I see it, the good men are not afraid of the law, but the average men are; 
average will no longer be good enough for men either. 546 
 
It is often the same critics who use “merit” based arguments against quotas, who point to 
graduation rates (women graduating at higher rates than men) to say that quotas are unnecessary.547 
Concern about women dominating boards because of their higher levels of education is another 
reason to implement quotas.  Quotas protect both genders from being underrepresented. With their 
implementation, men will never have to worry about being as poorly represented on boards in the 
future as women have been.  
From critical mass theory and the empirical data which supports this theory, three women 
on a board seems to be the transformative number.548 If implemented, a quota would ideally 
mandate that a reporting issuer board have at minimum three people of each gender. It may of 
course be that boards simply expand their size in order to adhere to the quota. This could be 
addressed by combining California’s quota with that of Norway. That is, a board with five 
members could be required to have two members of each gender, a board with six members might 
be required to have three members of each gender, 549 a board with nine members must have four 
                                               
politicians with earnings potential predicted by education, age, occupation and time before and after a mandatory 
quota was implemented. It was found that the quota led to both a greater proportion of females being nominated as 
well as the nomination of a greater proportion of competent male politicians. The only politicians who were pushed 
out because of the gender quota were the mediocre men. Thus, the overall competence of the party increased as a 
result of the quota, contrary to what many mandatory quota critics predicted. 
546 Seierstad, supra note 365 at 398. This is a quote from a participant in Seierstad’s study regarding the introduction 
of mandatory quotas in Norway.  
547 See again Senator Frum’s remarks, Senate Debate April 2010, supra not 205 and Epstein, supra note 163. 
548 Refer to Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion of the importance of this number. 
549 See Bill 826, supra note at 279, wherein corporations by the year 2021 will be required to have 2 female directors 
if their board has 5 directors, and 3 female directors if their board has 6 or more directors. 
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of each gender, and if the board has more than nine members, each gender must represent 40% of 
the board.550 This quota would effectively eliminate women’s underrepresentation on public 
boards, while addressing concerns that men may one day be poorly represented on these boards.  
Of course not all public issuers would be able to meet this quota and there should be 
exemptions available for those with smaller boards and smaller market capitalizations. Another 
crucial step to implementing a quota is that it be introduced gradually. A lesson should be learned 
from the Norwegian experience. To avoid an overnight transformation of public boards in Canada, 
a mandatory quota should be implemented in phases. It may be useful to allow corporations a few 
years to reach 20-30% female board representation (depending on their board sizes) and a further 
few years for boards to include three women or 40% representation of each gender (again, 
depending on board size).  
b) Voluntary 
If it is not within Canadian securities regulators’ capacity to implement mandatory quotas, they 
may implement a voluntary quota. Voluntary quotas still arguably do not solve most supply-side 
barriers. Furthermore, they have far less impact than mandatory quotas. The numbers and 
percentages for gender representation for a voluntary quota could match the example mandatory 
quota provided in the previous section. For instance, just as the proposed mandatory quota above 
would require a reporting issuer to have at least three men and three women on its board for a 
board with six members, a voluntary quota would recommend this same minimum gender 
representation. It would also be prudent to introduce voluntary quotas in a gradual manner; 
however, it may not be necessary to allow for as much time as the mandatory quotas should be 
                                               
550 See Norway’s Companies Act, amended in 2003, at § 6–11a. 
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given because there will not be a penalty for non-compliance. It would be useful to provide 
corporations with a list of acceptable reasons for non-compliance with the voluntary quota.  
Further, voluntary quotas could be combined with other incentives such as tax breaks.551 As 
Alstott states in reference to tax incentives combined with board gender quotas, “they preserve the 
appearance of voluntarism”.552 Those corporations which adopt the voluntary quota would be 
rewarded with paying lower taxes, and those which do not do so would pay more tax. In Canada 
taxes implemented for a social purpose are far from unheard of. The recent example of the 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, or what is colloquially known as the “Carbon Tax”, is a 
perfect example of tax incentives used to curb the behaviour of corporations to further a social 
goal.553 The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act received Royal Assent in June of 2018. Its 
object is, “to mitigate climate change through the pan-Canadian application of pricing mechanisms 
to a broad set of greenhouse gas emission sources and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts”.554 Tax incentives would certainly encourage more corporations to adopt the voluntary 
quota, while leaving the choice of whether to prioritize board diversity with issuers instead of the 
regulators.  
5.2.2.2 Stricter Disclosure 
“Non-numerical objectives such as “introducing a diversity policy” or “establishing a diversity council”, 
and aspirational objectives such as “achieving a culture of inclusion”, while individually worthwhile, are 
unlikely to be effective in improving gender diversity unless they are backed up with appropriate numerical 
targets.”  
                                               
551 See for instance Anne Alstott, “Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United 
States” (2014) 26:1 Pace Int’l L Rev 49 (suggestion that securities regulation could combined with tax incentives in 
order to create regulatory quotas). 
552 Ibid at 45. 
553Canada, Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act SC 2018, c 12, s 186, (assented to 21 June 2018). See also 
Katheryn Harrison, “COMMENTARY: How Canada’s carbon tax works - National | Globalnews.ca”, online: 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/5125670/how-the-carbon-tax-works/>. 
554 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, supra note 553. 
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- ASX Corporate Governance Code, Recommendation 1.5555 
As it stands, Canadian public boards will not reach parity for another 50 years, 556 100 years 
after women joined the labour force in great numbers. The OSC’s current gender diversity policy 
is meant to increase women’s participation on boards. In order to accomplish this objective within 
a reasonable time, regulatory reform is necessary.  
For those countries which have disclosure based diversity policies, Australia currently has 
the highest percentage of women on boards of public corporations.557 This may be due to the very 
clear recommendations set out in the ASX Corporate Governance Code. If Canada is to amend NI 
58-101F1, the ASX Code is an excellent model for stricter disclosure requirements. For instance, 
to comply with the Canadian model, reporting issuers might be required to disclose a diversity 
policy with set measurable targets and disclose these targets and its progress towards achieving 
those targets.558 Further, it could be required, as it is in Australia, that the largest firms (in Australia 
these are the S&P/ASX 300 Index corporations) have a measurable target of not less than 30% 
representation of each gender on the board.559 Canada could use this same percentage, or indeed 
take it one step further. The measurable target could be specific numbers of each gender depending 
on board size, as with the quotas described above. Alternatively, the measurable objective 
recommended could be 40% of each gender by a certain period. If reporting issuers are unable to 
comply with this target, they could provide an explanation as to why they are not.   
                                               
555 ASX Corporate Governance Code, 4th ed (February 2019) Recommendation 1.5, Commentary, online at 
<https://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-fourth-edn.pdf> [“ASX 
Corporate Governance Code”]. 
556 Roundtable 2017, supra note 175. 
557Women represent 29.7% of Australia’s publicly traded corporations’ boards. See  “Gender diversity progress 
stalling on ASX 200 boards”, online: <https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/media/media-releases/gender-diversity-
progress-stalling-on-asx-200-boards>. 
558 ASX Corporate Governance Code, supra note 555, Recommendation 1.5. 
559 Ibid. 
 123 
Currently, NI 58-101F1 requires reporting issuers to disclose the number and percentage of 
female board members, whether they have a policy regarding the representation of women on their 
board, how (if they do at all) they are implementing this policy, and whether they consider diversity 
during the nomination process. If they have no women, no policy, and no diversity nomination 
considerations, all they must do is explain why, with no guidance as to what appropriate 
explanations might be. There is no requirement that issuers set measurable targets, or any 
recommended number or percentage of female directors. At the very least, the policy contained in 
NI 58-101F1 should be amended to include specific recommendations for numbers or proportions 
of female directors. Issuers should be given something specific with which to comply. A model 
gender diversity policy should be provided in a companion policy and exact numbers and 
proportions should be prescribed. If these metrics are not complied with, then an explanation 
should be required.  
Just as quotas are criticized for not solving supply-side barriers, stricter disclosure would 
face similar criticism. However, the Australian model also addresses this criticism. 
Recommendation 1.5’s commentary suggests that listed companies: “Recognise that employees 
(female and male) at all levels may have domestic responsibilities and adopt flexible work 
practices that will assist them to meet those responsibilities.”560 Again, this may be a useful 
recommendation which could easily be introduced in a commentary accompanying NI 58-101F1. 
This recommendation would encourage firms to work towards eliminating the pool problem. 
As demonstrated above it is not entirely clear whether what makes quotas so effective are 
the harsh penalties which often accompany them, or whether it is the clear, numerical targets 
provided by the quotas with which firms must comply that make the difference. Whatever the 
                                               
560 Ibid. 
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answer, a stricter comply-or-explain model would at the very least be the logical next step towards 
progress in Canada, especially if a mandatory quota seems unpalatable at the present time.    
5.2.2.3 Say-on-Diversity 
One does not have to accept either the normative or the business case rationales to agree that 
a say-on-diversity vote may be an appropriate regulatory intervention. This is an alternative 
regulatory model which allows for corporate autonomy and greater shareholder participation.  A 
binding “say-on-diversity” vote, much like a “say-on-pay” vote may be mandated.561 The supply-
side issues described above which quotas fail to address, still would not be solved.562  
Management currently has incentives to either block diverse appointments, or not to be 
proactive in seeking female nominees because, as previously noted, women tend to be more 
scrupulous monitors of management.563 Just as the Dodd-Frank Act introduced a say-on-pay vote 
which led to significant changes to pay practices after unfavourable votes,564 the say-on-diversity 
vote would ideally lead to significant changes as well.565 Whether diversity is to be prioritized is 
left up to the shareholders. With a say-on-diversity vote the stigma attached to newly appointed 
female directors (if they were beneficiaries of quotas) would disappear566 and diversity efforts 
would almost certainly increase given the current shareholder demand for these. This solution fits 
within a shareholder primacy view of the board and management. It is not necessary to use 
normative case rationales to justify this form of regulatory intervention because it is one which 
allows for complete flexibility and shareholder participation. 
                                               
561 Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine Watson, “An Agency Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity” (2015) 
52 San Diego L Rev 1. 
562 Ibid at 58. 
563 Ibid at 64. 
564 Ibid at 63. 
565 In Canada, while most reporting issuers already held say-on-pay votes (see note 492) recently the CBCA was 
amended to include a provision mandating that “prescribed corporations” hold non-binding say-on-pay votes. See 
CBCA, supra note 8, section 125.1. 
566 See section 1.3.1.1. 
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One criticism of a say-on-diversity vote model is that, similarly to the current Canadian 
model, it is a very weak regulatory intervention. By leaving board diversity policies and what these 
might look like in the hands of reporting issuers, the progress may be similar to the progress already 
being made. Unless shareholders and institutional investors take on the responsibility of ensuring 
that public companies implement effective diversity policies with clear and measurable targets, it 
is perfectly likely that firms will implement policies which may not further women’s participation 
in a meaningful way.  
5.3  “IF I WERE A BOY”: SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTIONS 
 
Far less researched and proposed are supply-side solutions. These include work-family 
conflict reduction, flexible work hours, and mentorship programs aimed at increasing the number 
of board-ready females in Canada.567 These are certainly outside the realm of securities regulation 
in Canada, but are still important solutions to discuss. 
5.3.1 Work-Family Conflict Reduction and Flexible Hours 
  The value of these policies and the value of supporting those women who wish to prioritize 
their families is often under-estimated in the corporate world:  
“Corporate America seems to regard child bearing and child rearing as just a lifestyle 
choice that some women make, just as other women dedicate leisure time to improving 
their tennis game or to training for a marathon. Bearing children and raising them well, 
however, is not just another lifestyle choice. It is the source of human capital, a sufficient 
supply of which is critical to the society as a whole.”568  
 
                                               
567 Gabaldon et al, supra note 523 at 375. Although there are currently an ample number of board-ready females in 
Canada, there are still, despite graduation rates, far more board-ready men. Thus, while the so-called “pool problem” 
is not an accurate conception of the labour market, in so far as the number of board-ready females are not adequately 
represented on boards, see for instance, Dhir, supra note 23 at 577–579, it may still be important to address certain 
barriers which are stopping women who may wish to become board-ready from doing so. 
568 Branson, supra note 61 at 385. 
 126 
Furthermore, the idea that flexible work schedules and work-family conflicts are purely 
women’s issues569 may represent one of the greatest hurdles women in the corporate world must 
overcome. In fact, if allowed flexible work hours both men and women tend to take advantage of 
these at the same rate.570 A McKinsey survey found that despite common perceptions, men and 
women in middle and higher management positions were equally willing to give up aspects of 
their family lives to achieve career goals.571 One observes, for example, that Norway, where 
corporate culture is more open, non-hierarchical and encourages parental leave and work-from-
home policies, has the highest rate of female participation in politics and business.572  
5.3.2 Mentorship  
In addition to the above barriers, women who aspire to be on boards face a lack of 
mentorship. This barrier exists before women achieve their first board seat and after. First, because 
there are not as many female directors on boards and in executive officer positions, women have 
fewer role models and potentially fewer mentors encouraging their advancement and pursuit of 
leadership roles. Second, once a woman obtains her first board seat, it is difficult for her to obtain 
a second because she is less likely to receive mentorship from her fellow board members.573 A 
study by McDonald and Westphal showed that board members who are male tend to offer 
mentorship and advice to first-time male board members and are much less likely to offer same to 
first-time women.574 There are certain board procedural norms which one cannot glean simply 
from observation.575 For instance, this study used the example of obtaining the CEO’s approval 
                                               
569 Gabaldon et al, supra note 523 at 375. 
570 Carlson, supra note 7 at 386. 
571 McKinsey “Moving mind-sets on gender diversity”, online: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/organization/our-insights/moving-mind-sets-on-gender-diversity-mckinsey-global-survey-results>. 
572 Foster, supra note 17 at 409. 
573 McDonald & Westphal, supra note 513. 
574 Ibid at 1182. 
575 Ibid at 1173. 
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prior to a board meeting before raising concerns in the meeting as an important board procedural 
norm. First-time members would not know about this norm other than through mentorship. 
Because they are privy to mentorship far less often, first-time female board members tend to violate 
procedural norms much more often. They therefore make less than ideal first impressions, which 
have a lasting impact on their fellow board members. Hence, they are far less likely to be 
recommended for (and indeed hold far fewer) additional board seats than their first-time male 
counterparts.576 An obvious solution to this problem is for boards to adopt mentorship programs, 
both for those who have yet to sit on a board and for those first-time directors so that more women 
are able to progress beyond this point.  
Thus, while the supply-side barriers are for the most part beyond the scope of this paper, 
they may be crucial to achieving gender equality in the upper corporate echelons. It is worth noting 
that solutions to these barriers would work towards eliminating the pool problem identified by 
those who oppose stronger regulation, if there is in fact such a problem. If there is not, they may 
work towards putting to rest concerns of the pool problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
576 Ibid at 1183–1184. 
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“Hard to Say Goodbye”: Conclusion 
 
Women remain vastly underrepresented on public corporate boards in Canada. While most 
scholars and policy makers agree that this is a problem, there is no consensus on how this problem 
should be solved. The various solutions which have been presented in the last few years range 
from free market solutions to invasive regulatory intervention.  
This thesis has focused on regulatory intervention and the two main justifications used by 
proponents of regulation, those being the business case and the normative case. Neither seem to 
be standalone rationales capable of convincing those who do not already subscribe to their 
premises. The literature review in Chapter 1 revealed that the business case has not been 
conclusively proven empirically and that the normative case is difficult for those who view the 
board as a shareholder wealth maximizer to accept. 
If neither of these competing, or perhaps complementary, rationales have been accepted by 
the business community and scholars, what was the impetus for NI 58-101F1’s diversity disclosure 
policy? The securities regulation which was introduced in 2014, given the legislative journey from 
which it originated, appears to have been prompted by normative based concerns. That is, the 
Canadian government was first concerned with the unfairness of female board 
underrepresentation. However, given the mandate and regulatory constraints of securities 
regulators, they must justify regulatory intervention with concerns of investor protection, market 
fairness and efficiency, and more recently, reduction of systemic risk. They thus implemented a 
regulation which was ostensibly meant to better business and increase female representation on 
reporting issuer boards. But, the model chosen in fact achieves neither of these goals.   
 129 
The business case clearly has not persuaded business leaders or we would have seen much 
more rapid increases in female directorships. What is missing from this rationale? Why is it so 
unpersuasive? For one, the empirical evidence seems to be missing data about how critical mass 
theory applies to this issue. There have not been enough women on boards in Canada to test critical 
mass theory properly and this may not be possible without regulatory intervention. For another, 
risk aversion and the impact this could have on systemic risk does not seem to have been studied 
enough. Therefore the business case may not be dead. It may still be important to scholars and 
regulators. For instance, the OSC’s mandate now includes the reduction of systemic risk. There is 
empirical evidence which shows that increasing female representation on boards may reduce 
systemic risk. While this evidence is not yet conclusive, the OSC may be required to examine this 
question further, or at least might be able to justify stronger regulation while keeping within its 
mandate. 
As the normative case and its short comings were examined more closely, it became clear 
that in order to fully accept this rationale it may be useful to view the board as something other 
than a shareholder wealth maximizer. Even accepting the shareholder wealth maximization view 
of the board though, according to statutory and common law, boards of directors are free to pursue 
board diversity initiatives. This however is really a business judgement decision, not a requirement 
under law. Regulatory intervention remains necessary. 
Finally, the barriers to women’s advancement and regulatory options were analysed. 
Although the perfect regulatory model may not be as yet obvious, it is clear that NI 58-101F1 in 
its current formulation is increasing female representation on boards at a glacial pace. Stronger 
regulation is required. Justifying this with normative, business or both rationales, with a view to 
reducing systemic risk, should still allow for at least stricter disclosure requirements, or at the very 
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least a say-on-diversity vote. A voluntary or mandatory quota may be the necessary evil to achieve 
real change in a reasonable amount of time. Whatever regulatory amendments are selected, they 
should be selected in a timely manner in order to begin to bring change. Women have been waiting 
long enough. 
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